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Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness
Lauryn P. Gouldin ∗
There is a growing national consensus about the urgent need to shrink
the population of pretrial detainees and to fix our broken money bail
system. Even as scholars and reformers are showing renewed interest in
pretrial detention and bail, however, they have neglected a fundamental
pretrial problem: the conflation (by judges and in statutes) of flight risk
and danger. Reformers have offered up an array of proposals and
increasingly sophisticated risk assessment tools that promise to improve
judicial decision-making, but many of these tools merge flight risk and
danger in ways that reinforce problematic legislative and
judicial practices.
This Article identifies the legal and practical reasons that judges
must evaluate flight risk independently of danger. Federal and state
constitutions and statutes include detention and bail provisions that
require judges to make separate determinations of flight risk and
dangerousness. There are also compelling policy arguments for separating
flight from danger. First, combining risks may cause judges to
overestimate both kinds of risks. Second, forcing separate analyses of
pretrial risks may provide judges with much-needed political cover
(alleviating pressure to detain). In addition, isolating the two types of
risks offers an opportunity to improve judicial accountability and system
legitimacy. Finally, the conditions of release that judges employ to
mitigate flight risk are different from those that are used to manage
danger. Disentangling flight risk from dangerousness will be a critical
piece of efforts to improve pretrial decision-making and reduce
unnecessary pretrial detention.
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INTRODUCTION
On any given day, jails in the United States hold an average of over
450,000 pretrial detainees. 1 There is a growing consensus that reforms
are urgently needed to reduce our overreliance on pretrial detention
and that our nationwide money bail crisis has reached a “tipping
point.” 2 Federal, state, and local officials are increasingly vocal about
the deeply flawed structures and policies that have led to a neardoubling of annual jail admissions over the last three decades. 3
By most accounts, we are now well into what has been called the
third generation of bail reform. 4 As with other criminal justice reform
efforts, the range of different bail reform efforts percolating around
the country is driven by a mix of moral outrage and economic reality.

1. Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE at 3 (June 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (indicating that
the number of unconvicted jail inmates increased from 453,200 at midyear 2013 to 457,500 at
midyear 2014). The United States now leads the world in the total number of individuals
detained before trial. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Brief, Pre-Trial/Remand Prison Population:
Trend, United States, PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/united-statesamerica (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (pre-trial population of 453,200 as of 2013).
2. Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice, Remarks at ABA’s 11th Annual Summit on
Public Defense (Feb. 6, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/directorlisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-annual-summit) (describing consensus
that current bail practices are “deeply troubling”).
3. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 7, 45 (2015) (stating that jail admissions increased
from “six million in 1983 to 11.7 million in 2013”).
4. KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, DISPELLING THE MYTHS:
WHAT POLICY MAKERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCH 2 n.1 (2012) (noting
that since 2000, there has been an increase in focus on the pretrial portion of the criminal
process, referred to as the “third wave” of bail reform—the first wave beginning in the 1960s,
the second beginning in the 1980s); Timothy R. Schnacke, Claire M.B. Booker & Michael R.
Jones, The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DENV. U. L. REV. (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-bailreform.html (“[J]urisdictions across the country are [implementing], in a wave of legislation,
policy changes, and various projects aimed at improving pretrial justice.”).
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It is apparent that we cannot afford our bloated, wealth-based pretrial
detention system. We also cannot abide it. 5
Many current reforms attack the ways that bail amounts are set
and push for greater reliance on nonfinancial conditions of release. In
2015 and 2016, plaintiffs successfully waged class action challenges to
existing money bail systems in a number of jurisdictions. 6 The
Department of Justice stated the problem plainly in the first sentence
of a Statement of Interest that it filed in the first of those lawsuits:
“Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for
their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash
bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 7 Other reforms focus on who pays bail, including
efforts to prohibit commercial bail 8 and increased use of communitysupported bail funds. 9

5. As United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch explained in a December 2015
speech, “When bail is set unreasonably high, people are behind bars only because they are poor.
Not because they’re a danger or a flight risk—only because they are poor.” Loretta Lynch, U.S.
Attorney Gen., Remarks at White House Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3,
2015) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-elynch-delivers-remarks-white-house-convening-incarceration-and); see also Complaint at 7,
Buffin v. City of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-4959 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015) (challenging
“wealth-based detention”); cf. Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention,
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2012) (“[T]he
decision to imprison a defendant before trial all too often hinges on wealth and power.”).
6. For a more detailed discussion of these class-action litigation efforts, see infra
Section I.C.4.
7. Statement of Interest at 1, Varden v. City of Dayton, No. 2:15-cv-34 (M.D. Ala. Feb.
3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/file/340461/download. This Statement of Interest has since
been cited in bail challenges across the country. See Foster, supra note 2.
8. Commercial bail bondsmen or commercial sureties provide bail to defendants for a
price and have, over time, become a fixture in American criminal justice. Efforts to reform bail
are frequently challenged by lobbyists for these companies. The Open Society Institute is one of
a number of groups that advocates for abolition of these for-profit bail enterprises. See generally
JUSTICE POLICY INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY
CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS 1–3, 20 (2011), http://www.
justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/pretrial_detention_and_remand_to_custo
dy.pdf (observing that other countries like Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and England
do not permit commercial bail).
9. In 2015, the New York City Council recommended that the city allocate $1.4 million
of community funds to pay “bail set at $2,000 or lower for [indigent] defendants charged with
low-level misdemeanors . . . .” Emily Ngo, NYC Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito Proposes
(June
17,
2015),
Bail
Fund
for
Indigent
Defendants,
NEWSDAY
http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/melissa-mark-viverito-nyc-council-speakerproposes-bail-fund-for-indigent-defendants-1.10554795; see also Jocelyn Simonson, Bail
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Some reforms have come from the legislature; for example, New
Jersey made comprehensive changes to its state bail laws in 2014 to
shift away from reliance on money bail. 10 Similar legislation is pending
in New Mexico and has been proposed in New York. 11
One key component of many reforms has been the adoption of
actuarial-style pretrial risk assessment tools. These tools promise to
improve judges’ pretrial calculations of the likelihood that a released
defendant will either fail to appear for trial (“flight risk”) 12 or commit
other crimes (“public safety risk” or “dangerousness”). 13 By 2015,
approximately ten percent of jurisdictions in the United States had
adopted some sort of empirically-based risk assessment tool, and that
number continues to rise. 14
All of these reforms work toward either (or both) of two
overlapping goals: (i) reducing the population of pretrial detainees
overall and/or (ii) helping judges make “smarter” pretrial decisions
by better identifying risky defendants. 15 As with past generations of
Nullification (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14–19) (on file with author) (describing the
growing phenomenon of community bail funds in detail). See also infra Section IV.B (brief
discussion of community bail funds).
10. 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31 (2014) (West) (including several new provisions
that shift away from reliance on monetary bail); Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 – General
Election, Constitutional Amendment to Allow a Court to Order Pretrial Detention of a Person in
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Dec.
2,
2014),
a
Criminal
Case,
N.J.
http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-general-public-question1.pdf (amending constitution to eliminate constitutional right to bail and to permit judges to
order pretrial detention based on public safety concerns).
11. Alex Goldsmith, Bail constitutional amendment compromise clears House, KRQE
NEWS 13 (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:05 PM), http://krqe.com/2016/02/15/bail-constitutionalamendment-compromise-clears-house/. During his most recent State of the State address,
Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed similar reforms for New York. Andrew Cuomo, Governor
of
N.Y.,
2016
State
of
the
State
and
Budget
Address
(Jan.
13,
2016), https://www.ny.gov/programs/2016-state-state-and-budget-address.
12. See infra Section I.A (defining flight risk).
13. See infra Section I.B (defining dangerousness).
14. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. [hereinafter Arnold Found.], PUBLIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention
/public-safety-assessment/; see also, e.g., Press Release, Arnold Found., Data-driven tool gives
Harris County judges new way to assess defendants’ pretrial risk level (May 24, 2016),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/data-driven-tool-gives-harris-county-judges-new-wayassess-defendants-pretrial-risk-level/(identifying additional jurisdiction adopting risk
assessment tool).
15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BJA-2014-3874, SMART PRETRIAL DETENTION
INITIATIVE FY 2014 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT 6 (2014), https://
www.bja.gov/Funding/14SmartPretrialSol.pdf (describing federal grant program to research
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bail reform, there seems to be general agreement that constraining or
improving judicial discretion is a central piece of the pretrial puzzle.16
Although risk assessment tools have been the subject of criticism, 17
their promises—to make pretrial decision-making less subjective, to
improve risk prediction, and to alleviate pressure on judges to err on
the side of (over)detention—are understandably appealing.
One key problem with most of the risk assessment tools employed
in the federal system and around the country, however, is that they
combine flight risk and dangerousness into a single “risk of pretrial
failure” score. 18 This surprising oversight fails to address—and
inadvertently reinforces—a significant, fundamental, and perennial
problem with pretrial judicial decision-making that should be a central
focus of bail reform efforts: judges’ muddling of flight risk and
dangerousness in the pretrial process. 19

and support programs that use risk assessment tools to improve pretrial decision-making;
explaining that program goals include “cost savings and public safety enhancements”); Anne
Milgram, Why smart statistics are the key to fighting crime, TED (Jan. 2014),
http://www.ted.com/talks/anne_milgram_why_smart_statistics_are_the_key_to_fighting_cri
me/transcript?language=en (explaining that the Arnold Foundation risk assessment research
intends to fix “incredible system errors, where we’re incarcerating low-level, nonviolent people
and we’re releasing high-risk, dangerous people”).
16. John S. Goldkamp & E. Rely Vîlcicã, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda
of American Bail Reform: Lessons from Philadelphia’s Evidence-Based Judicial Strategy, in
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY: SPECIAL ISSUE NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 117 (Austin Sarat ed., vol. 47, 2009) (explaining that bail reform efforts
must include “a viable method for addressing the difficult problems of judicial discretion that
lie at the core of bail, pretrial release, and detention problems in the United States”); JOHN
S. GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN
EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM 14–15 (1985) (“The exercise of discretion by bail judges
was of great concern to early critics of the administration of bail in the United States for two
related reasons: the questionable purposes bail was seen to serve and the debatable criteria
relied on by judges in arriving at their decisions.”); cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 455 (2016) [hereinafter Wiseman, Fixing Bail] (describing “judicial
discretion” as a “significant factor” in the pretrial detention crisis and observing that “when
judges’ discretion is more constrained, it appears more defendants are released without a
concomitant increase in crime or flight”).
17. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Sections I.D.3.
19. This problem has been documented by bail reformers dating to the early twentieth
century. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 15 (describing studies dating to 1927
that documented that bail was being used by judges to manage dangerousness (and not merely
for the legitimate purpose of ensuring appearance)); Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 120–
21 (citing Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038–39 (1954) (describing prior studies that identified that money
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This Article asserts that judges must analyze flight risk and
dangerousness independently. By extension, the tools that are being
developed to aid and guide judicial risk assessment must also provide
separate risk measures. This Article marshals constitutional, statutory,
and policy-based arguments to illustrate why this disentangling project
is integral to reform efforts. Although reformers have begun to focus
on this issue, 20 it has not yet been examined by the small but growing
group of twenty-first century bail scholars. 21
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background—
briefly explaining the historical role of flight risk in driving pretrial
decisions, tracing the changes in state and federal statutes to permit
bail was being used for incapacitative purposes—to accomplish sub rosa the detention of
“dangerous” defendants—as a means to ‘break crime waves,’ or, simply, as a method for inflicting
punishment as well as to express personal prejudice toward certain defendants). Judges’ tendency
to merge flight risk and danger in evaluating pretrial risk continues to be a problem. See Shima
Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 549–50 (2012)
(explaining that “[m]ost state judges consider dangerousness at a much higher rate than flight
risk, though most states claim to consider both factors in release decisions and some even state
the flight risk is the primary consideration”); cf. Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference is
Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1349–
60 (2012) (describing the merger of flight risk and dangerousness as part of the over-detention
of material witnesses in the decade after September 11, 2001).
20. As outlined in Section I.D.3, infra, there is one pretrial risk assessment tool that
separates flight risk from dangerousness. Although the Arnold Foundation advertises that
feature, it does not explain why it is essential. ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT:
RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA 3, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf.
21. For most of the nearly three decades since the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Salerno, bail and pretrial detention have been neglected in academic literature. Shima
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 725–26 (2011)
[hereinafter Baradaran, Innocence] (describing reduced scholarly attention to bail and pretrial
detention issues in recent decades); Samuel R. Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail
Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 121, 123 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Discrimination] (observing that
“[t]here has been relatively little innovation in the law and scholarship on bail in the twenty years
since Salerno”). In the last several years, however, there has been a much-needed resurgence of
interest in these topics. See Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 420 (noting that “[r]ecently,
a handful of scholars has rejuvenated the debate, focusing on the continuing problems of the
pretrial system and the legal avenues for addressing them left open by Salerno.”); Appleman,
supra note 5, at 1303 (“Although bail and detention was a popular scholarly topic a generation
ago, only a few contemporary legal academics have scrutinized the current machinations of
pretrial release.”). Even with this renewed interest, there has been too little focus on issues
around judicial decision-making in this context. Cf. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 24
(“[L]egal literature, too, has largely focused on the difficulties associated with predicting
dangerousness generally, rather than on the decisionmaking [sic] process.”); id. at 43 (briefly
asserting that “the risks of dangerousness and flight should be separately scored” but not
elaborating on justifications for that separation).
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some pretrial detention based on dangerousness, and outlining
problems with current practices. Part I concludes by analyzing the
evolution of pretrial risk measurement from judicial intuition and
statutory risk factors to modern actuarial risk assessment tools.
As outlined in Part II, flight risk must be measured and evaluated
independently of dangerousness because federal and state laws
governing pretrial detention and release frequently require separate
consideration of these distinct risks. These legal requirements are the
product of both (i) constitutional and statutory limitations on the
circumstances in which pretrial detention may be ordered by a judge
and (ii) constitutional and statutory provisions governing the
imposition of bail or other conditions of release.
Judges must also consider flight risk and dangerousness
independently for several policy reasons that are outlined in Part III
of the Article. First, combining the risks may cause judges to
overestimate both kinds of risks. Second, forcing separate analyses of
pretrial risks may provide judges with political cover, alleviating
pressure to detain. In addition, isolating flight risk from danger may
improve the feedback that judges receive about release decisions—
either through data about release outcomes or as embedded in
validated risk assessment tools. Finally, courts have a range of readily
available conditions of release that can be used to manage pretrial risks,
but those conditions mitigate flight and danger in different ways and
to varying degrees.
I. DECONSTRUCTING PRETRIAL DECISION-MAKING
For judges abiding by statutory requirements, the pretrial process
turns out to be a blend of art, science, and will. Judges first evaluate
factors deemed by the legislature to be relevant to flight risk and
danger to gauge the pretrial riskiness of a particular defendant. As
outlined in greater detail below, the risk assessment process is evolving
from what has traditionally been loosely-guided intuitive judgment to
something more scientific and data driven. State and federal statutes
generally contain presumptions in favor of unrestricted release for
defendants before trial, but if the risks are too high, judges must
undertake a second statutory task: developing a plan for managing
pretrial risks. There is a third crucial step: judges must have the will
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(and perhaps the job security) to make release or detention decisions
based on those calculations. 22
This Section makes clear that the current problem with bail and
pretrial detention is a function of the confused mismanagement of
flight risk and danger in contemporary pretrial practice. How did we
get here? The following subsections briefly explain the history of the
relationship between flight risk and bail, describe the evolution of
preventive pretrial detention (i.e., pretrial detention to manage
danger), 23 and outline how these two pretrial risks—flight and
danger—are currently mismanaged and mismeasured.
A. Flight Risk and Bail: Historically
The need to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial has
historically been the principal driver of judicial decisions around bail
and pretrial detention. 24 Judges have always been expected to make
predictions of a defendant’s so-called “flight risk” or risk of
nonappearance. 25 Flight risk is properly assigned to defendants who
are expected to flee a jurisdiction or to be difficult to locate. 26
22. See infra Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion of how disentangling flight risk
and dangerousness might address these political issues.
23. The expression “preventive detention” is used throughout the Article in the
traditional sense to refer to detention that is intended to prevent future crimes. It does not
include detention that might be intended to “prevent” flight.
24. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1951) (“If the defendant is admitted to bail,
the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or
justice will insure [sic] the presence of the defendant . . . .”); see also Appleman, supra note 5, at
1335 (“[A]lthough the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail cannot be conclusively
determined, all the available evidence points to the fact that pretrial detention, both under the
English common law and at the time the Constitution was written, was limited to flight risk.”);
GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 51 (“[O]ne aim of [first generation] bail reform
was to influence judges to restrict their motives or purposes in bail decisionmaking [sic] to the
one viewed as legitimate—guaranteeing the defendant’s attendance at required proceedings.”).
Before the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987),
flight risk was the only legitimate (i.e., constitutional) basis for detaining a defendant before trial.
Salerno is discussed in detail in Section I.B.3, infra.
25. These terms—flight risk and nonappearance—are too often used interchangeably in
court decisions, in academic literature, and in risk assessment tools. As this author asserts in
another work in progress, titled Defining Flight Risk, the terms are not truly interchangeable.
That project builds on the arguments outlined here: if flight risk is isolated properly from danger,
it is easier to undertake the task of defining precisely what flight risk means and how to manage
it. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk (forthcoming 2017).
26. This category of defendants who would be inclined to flee (and who might pose a risk
of being successful doing so) is a small category of all non-appearing defendants. With advances
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Judges traditionally managed flight risk by setting bail or imposing
other conditions of release to secure defendants’ future appearance.
Bail—the practice of requiring a defendant or his sureties to put up
money or property to incentivize the defendant to return to court—
has a long pedigree in this country and in England before here. 27 Aside
from early English practices, where bail was sometimes set to
approximate the debt that a defendant might owe to a victim at the
resolution of a case, 28 money bail has traditionally been justified as a
means of discouraging flight by enticing released defendants back to
court to recover their money or property. 29
In most states and under federal law, from 1789 to the 1960s,
individuals who were arrested for noncapital offenses were entitled to
bail. 30 Indeed, this right, generally envisioned as essential to the
presumption of innocence, was incorporated into many state
constitutions. 31 At the federal level, this right to bail was part of the

in GPS monitoring and other technology, disappearing has become much more difficult, so this
is also a shrinking subcategory of non-appearing defendants. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial
Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1352–53 (2014) [hereinafter
Wiseman, Detention] (“Recent, extensive changes in technology, such as the rise of Internet
photos and enhanced police communication, have greatly decreased flight incentives, and
technologies such as GPS monitoring also allow the police to easily monitor those individuals
who still have an incentive to flee.”). The broader category of non-appearing defendants includes
a range of more innocuous and preventable conduct that calls for different types and degrees of
supervision and management. See Gouldin, supra note 25.
27. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352 (“Since the founding of this country,
judges have required individuals to post some form of collateral in order to incentivize them to
appear at a trial that they strongly wish to avoid—a process that could ultimately lead to their
conviction and imprisonment.”) (citation omitted).
28. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 40 (2014).
29. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352.
30. See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531–32 (1983) (explaining
that Pennsylvania’s constitutional provision which provided a right to bail for all but capital
offenses “became the model for almost every state constitution adopted after 1776”).
31. See id.; see also Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 727–28 (explaining that the
presumption of innocence has historically operated in several ways: it “required a legal
determination at trial to punish a defendant for a crime,” it was the foundation for the right to
bail in noncapital cases, and “it did not allow judges to detain defendants because they were
likely to commit a crime while released, or to weigh the evidence against defendants before trial,
in deciding whether they should be released”); GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at
19–20 (describing historical criticism of “pretrial detention . . . as an affront to the notion of
presumption of innocence”).
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Judiciary Act of 1789. 32 Although this right was not included in the
United States Constitution, the Eighth Amendment does state that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”33 The Supreme Court has given
this clause very limited attention 34 and, to date, the excessive bail
provision has not provided significant protection for pretrial detainees. 35
In passing the 1966 Bail Reform Act, Congress significantly
narrowed the federal right to bail by empowering courts, at least in
certain cases, to deny bail and order defendants to be detained until
trial. 36 Until the 1980s, however, a federal judge could only legally
order detention (i.e., deny bail) based on flight risk. 37
B. Legitimizing Detention for Dangerousness
Notwithstanding this history, the one-dimensional task of
predicting and managing flight risk has long been complicated by
judicial and community concerns about a second, separate risk: the
danger that a defendant released before trial poses to public safety. 38
As outlined below, dangerousness eventually came to be viewed by

32. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73. Until 1966, this right to bail was also part of
Rule 46(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (drafted in 1944). FED. R. CRIM. P.
46(a)(1) (1944).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21, at 123. (“There has been relatively little
innovation in the law and scholarship on bail since Salerno . . . .”); see also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-54 (1987) (citing only two previous cases where the Supreme Court
addressed the Excessive Bail Clause (Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 (1952) and Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)).
35. Samuel R. Wiseman makes a very compelling case that detention of non-dangerous
defendants is almost always “excessive” as a means of managing flight risk given the ready availability
of cheap and effective electronic monitoring. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1392.
36. The 1966 Bail Reform Act included a presumption in favor of release, but if the court
could not devise conditions of release that would assure the defendant’s appearance at trial, the
court could order a defendant to be detained. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3152 (2012).
37. Id. (listing only “the appearance of the person” as a relevant pretrial concern for
judges). As other scholars have noted, however, the legislative history for the 1966 Act makes
clear that at least some legislators acknowledged that preventive pretrial detention might be
justifiable in the future. Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2296). More detail about current bail practices
is provided in Sections I.C.3–5, infra.
38. This Article principally uses the term “dangerousness” both because it is easy
shorthand and because it is a more precise descriptor (than the vague “public safety risk” or
some broader risk of reoffending) of the type of risk that most justifies pretrial detention.
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state and federal legislatures, and by the Supreme Court, as a
legitimate basis for pretrial detention in some cases. This subpart
briefly recounts the evolution of that doctrine.
1. Pretextual preventive detention
Even before dangerousness was deemed a legitimate basis for
pretrial detention, judges made decisions about pretrial release and
bail with an eye toward the perceived dangerousness of the defendants
standing before them. Prior to the adoption of the modern state and
federal statutes that explicitly permit some consideration of public
safety risks, it was widely acknowledged that judges deliberately set
unaffordable bail amounts on pretextual flight risk grounds so that
dangerous individuals would be detained until trial. 39
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress and most state
legislatures, amended or rewrote bail statutes to adapt to what had
been happening at bail hearings for decades. The federal statute, most
state statutes, and most state constitutions now permit some detention
for dangerousness. 40 These legislative changes clearly responded to the
public’s increasing fears of criminal activity and, specifically, to reports
of high rates of recidivism among those on pretrial release. 41 On the
one hand, then, these changes were clearly intended to lead to some
increase in preventive pretrial detention. 42
According to some reformers, however, the goal was not
necessarily to increase pretrial detention, but to regulate what judges
were already doing. In their view, the new state and federal legislation
39. Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of the
Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspectives, 32 PACE L. REV.
800, 813 (2012) (explaining that between 1966 and 1984, “federal courts were taking matters
into their own hands, effectively denying bail in cases where they deemed defendants to be
dangerous by setting inordinately high bail, albeit on stated grounds of risk of flight.”);
Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 128 (describing the historical problem of the “sub rosa
use of preventive detention through cash bail”).
40. See infra Sections III.B.1–2, which review these provisions in more detail; see also
GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 23 (lamenting that second generation bail
reform had “modified itself to accommodate preventive detention as a legitimate bail function”).
41. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3, 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185,
3189 (asserting that reform was necessary to “address the alarming problem of crimes
committed by persons on release” and to empower courts “to make release decisions” based on
“the danger a person may pose to others if released”); see also Scott, supra note 37, at 6
(describing the studies).
42. See Scott, supra note 37, at 6.
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simply made explicit considerations of dangerousness that had long
animated judicial decision-making around bail and pretrial
detention. 43 There was some expectation that allowing judges to be
transparent about their assessment of defendants’ dangerousness
would discourage judges from using flight risk as a pretext for dangerbased detention decisions. As described by some legislators, the
changes introduced to the federal statute were expected to make bail
decisions more “honest[]” and protect the integrity of the process. 44
The following subsection examines the specific statutory changes
that introduced dangerousness as a pretrial consideration in some
federal cases. These provisions were later upheld by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Salerno. 45
2. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
By permitting federal judges to rely explicitly on the
dangerousness of a defendant in making certain pretrial decisions, the
federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 followed the lead of a number of
similar state statutes. 46 The Act expressly states that the terms of a

43. See id. at 6–7; Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of
1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 1093–94 (1993).
44. Daniel Richman, The Story of United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of
Regulatory Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT LEADING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 413, 419 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (explaining that part of the
rationale for the Bail Reform Act was a desire to bring the statute in line with judicial practices);
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 11 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3194 (explaining that
permitting detention for dangerousness “would allow the courts to address the issue of pretrial
criminality honestly and effectively”).
45. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
46. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Act of 1970 was one of the
first statutes that allowed judges to order defendants detained before trial based on concerns
about public safety. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,
PUB. L. NO. 91-358, 84 STAT. 473, 642–43 (1970) (requiring the release of a defendant “unless
the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required or the safety of any other person or the
community”); Scott, supra note 37, at 4–5. This preventive detention feature of the act was
attacked in a series of cases, but was ultimately held constitutional. See United States v. Edwards,
430 A.2d 1321, 1342–43 (D.C. 1981) (en banc); De Veau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308
(D.C. 1982) (same), abrogated by Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 581 (D.C. 1989) (en
banc). Thirty-four states passed statutes similar to the District of Columbia’s before 1984. See
Appleman, supra note 5, at 1330. For a detailed description of modern state statutes’ approaches
to factoring dangerousness into pretrial decision-making, see Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note
19, at 506–13.
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defendant’s pretrial release turn on a judicial officer’s assessment of
both flight risk and dangerousness. The statute begins with a direction
to the judge that she
shall order the pretrial release of a person on personal recognizance,
or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the
judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of
any other person or the community. 47

The italicized text illustrates the pairing of the two risks; they are
similarly conjoined in multiple other places in the statute.
If the judge believes that a defendant is too great a flight or public
safety risk, she may impose conditions of release on the defendant in
order to mitigate those risks. 48 The statute is clear that judges must
choose “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of
conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community,” 49 but the interplay between flight risk and
danger and the connection between these risks and the conditions the
judge may impose are not well- articulated. 50
The most significant and controversial change in the 1984 Act
related to its detention provisions. For defendants charged with
certain specified categories of very serious offenses, if there were not
conditions of release that could effectively mitigate those defendants’
dangerousness, judges could order detention. 51 In fact, the Act created
a rebuttable presumption in favor of preventive detention for
defendants arrested for certain more serious offenses and defendants
with certain types of prior convictions. 52
Although the risk of dangerousness is not clearly defined in the
Bail Reform Act, courts have construed it broadly—in part, at the
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
48. Id. § 3142(c).
49. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). Many state statutes contain similar language. See Wiseman,
Detention, supra note 26, at 1395 n.229 (collecting statutes).
50. For further discussion, see infra Section III.D.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (“If the judicial officer determines that [a defendant] may
flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community, such judicial officer shall order the
detention of such person.”).
52. Id. § 3142(e)(2)–(3). These detention provisions and procedures are examined more
closely in Section II.B, infra.
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direction of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. In passing the
1984 Act, the Committee provided an example of what it viewed as
“dangerousness”: “[T]he risk that a defendant will continue to engage
in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any other
person or the community.’” 53 As a result, at least under some
interpretations of the federal statute, defendants can be deemed
“public safety risks” if they pose a risk of committing any crime on
release; the label is not limited to those who may commit violent or
dangerous crimes. 54
3. United States v. Salerno
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of some
preventive pretrial detention in its 1987 decision United States v.
Salerno. 55 The Salerno Court upheld the Bail Reform Act, against a
facial challenge, on the ground that these provisions were
“regulatory,” and that they furthered the government’s legitimate
interest in the safety of the community. 56
It is worth emphasizing that Salerno does not provide a blanket
authorization for preventive pretrial detention. 57 The Salerno holding
expressly rested on the limits of the statute. 58 In the Court’s view, the
liberty interests implicated by pretrial detention were sufficiently
protected by “Congress’ careful delineation of the circumstances

53. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3196; see
Kalhous & Meringolo, supra note 39, at 806–07; see also Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note
21, at 143 (collecting federal cases that broadly construe “danger” under the Bail Reform Act).
54. Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21, at 143 (citing to cases that broadly interpret
“danger” under the Bail Reform Act); cf. Appleman, supra note 5, at 1339 (criticizing the
“imprecision of [this] terminology” in the Bail Reform Act). One appealing feature of the newest
pretrial risk assessment tool on the market is that it differentiates between this sort of broad
public safety risk and the narrower, more concerning, and more difficult to manage risk of
violence. See Section I.D.3, infra, for more discussion of the PSA-Court assessment tool.
55. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
56. Id. at 746–49; see also id. at 747 (“[T]he punitive/regulatory distinction turns on
‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it].” (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
57. See Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 7 (on file with author) (explaining that
Salerno “held that neither substantive due process, procedural due process, nor the Excessive
Bail Clause categorically prohibits preventive detention”).
58. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention . . .
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”).
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under which detention [is] permitted.” 59 As the Court explained,
“[t]he Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a
specific category of extremely serious offenses” and it rests on specific
legislative findings that “individuals [arrested for those crimes] are far
more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community
after arrest.” 60
The Court also identified several other safeguards to a defendant’s
liberty interests: to detain a defendant, the Act requires probable cause
that the defendant committed the crime, and it states that the
government must prove its case to detain for dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual poses a risk to public
safety. 61 In addition, the Court cited the fact that the Act requires the
judicial officer to make written findings of fact and a statement of
reasons to detain and grants immediate appellate review. 62
C. Mismanaging Flight and Danger
Once judges evaluate the risks posed by a particular defendant,
they have tiers of risk-management options they can employ. As
outlined briefly below, mismanagement of flight risk and
dangerousness occurs at every step, whether defendants are released
or detained. The following subsections detail some of the specific ways
judges mismanage pretrial risks, including: releasing too few
defendants on their own recognizance; imposing excessive and
counterproductive nonfinancial conditions on defendants who are
released; imposing overly burdensome financial conditions on
defendants who are released; detaining too many low-risk individuals
who are simply too poor to afford their bail; and, relatedly, using
unaffordable money bail pretextually to ensure the detention of
defendants perceived as dangerous.

59. Id. at 751. The Salerno Court’s view of the meaning of “excessiveness”—and its
relationship to the purposes articulated by the government—is examined in more detail in
Section II.A, infra.
60. Id. at 750.
61. Id. at 751–52.
62. Id. at 752.
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1. Neglect of release on recognizance
Defendants who pose low risks of flight and danger should be
released on their own recognizance (i.e., without any court-imposed
restrictions). 63 It is essential to present this as the first inquiry—as
many statutes do—because release protects the presumption of
innocence. 64 Most statutes are structured in this way to preserve the
idea that ordering pretrial detention is a last resort.
Over the last several decades there has been a significant reduction
in the number of defendants who are released on recognizance. 65 That
drop is explained by increases in the imposition of bail and other
conditions of release and in pretrial detention, both of which are
examined more closely in the following subsections.
2. Counterproductive use of nonfinancial conditions of release
Defendants who pose risks of flight and/or danger that make
them too risky to be released on recognizance may still be released
with a range of possible conditions imposed on them. 66 Unfortunately,
however, statutes give judges almost no direction about which
conditions of release effectively manage which kinds of risk. 67
So-called “bail” statutes include a number of nonfinancial
conditions of release (examined in this Section) that can be imposed
in lieu of or in addition to bail or bonds (examined in the next
Section). Typical nonfinancial conditions include requiring a
defendant to: remain in the custody of a third party; seek or maintain
employment or education; refrain from associating with particular

63. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 10–17 (explaining that this is not a zero
risk requirement).
64. Cf. Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 730–31 (elaborating on historical
recognition of the link between general right to bail and fundamental presumption of
innocence); Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 426 (“Despite legislative treatment of
pretrial release as a default, and requirements that judges make certain findings when departing
from the default, pretrial detention rates are high and have risen steadily . . . .”).
65. SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 3, at 29 (explaining that in the two decades from 1990 to
2009, the ROR rate dropped significantly; “in 2009 (the latest year for which data are available),
those released on their own recognizance (also referred to as ROR) made up only 23 percent of
all felony defendants released pretrial”).
66. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). These conditions of release are examined
in more detail in Section IV.D, infra.
67. See infra Section IV.D.
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people; abide by restrictions on travel and housing; comply with
curfews or restrictions on living arrangements; refrain from excessive
alcohol use; avoid all drug use; not possess weapons; report regularly
to supervising authorities; and undergo medical, psychiatric and/or
substance abuse treatment. 68 Judges are not limited to these
conditions; most statutes permit them to craft other appropriate
conditions of release. 69
Studies raise real questions about how well judges tailor conditions
of release to the risks they identify. Although unaffordable bail and
overuse of pretrial detention get more attention from scholars and
reformers, 70 there are also reasons to be concerned about overloading
defendants with expensive and counterproductive conditions of
release. As Marie VanNostrand has explained:
Despite the appealing logic of involving low‐risk individuals in
intensive programming to prevent them from graduating to more
serious behavior, numerous studies show that certain programs may
actually worsen their outcomes. 71

In a recent article analyzing probation conditions, Fiona Doherty
explains why this might be: “[T]he expectations set by many standard
conditions fall differently on those who are poor and least able to make
their experiences visible.” 72 Doherty describes in detail how some
standard conditions operate differently on poor defendants:

68. 18 U.S.C § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012) (identifying conditions which may be imposed by
the court to assure defendant’s appearance at trial and the safety of the community).
69. See, e.g., id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (stating the court may require the defendant to
“satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community.”).
70. Cf. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 344 (2016) (explaining that probation gets too little scrutiny
from scholars who focus instead on incarceration because of probation’s “outdated reputation
as a progressive alternative to incarceration”); see also id. (“[T]he hope that probation might
solve the problems of mass incarceration has led policymakers to glide over the problems created
by probation itself.”).
71. See Marie VanNostrand, Presentation at the California Realignment Conference:
Using Evidence to Advance Effective Justice Realignment Pretrial 5 (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/211/7e/f/247/panel_1.1_vannostrand_impacting_pretr
ial_jail_populations_092111_2.pdf.
72. Doherty, supra note 70, at 345; see also id. at 349 (observing that “people are poor
because of long-standing factors like educational background, family circumstances, and lack of
stable work history”).

854

2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

837

10/1/16 5:29 PM

Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness
The requirement to report as directed, for example, can be
disproportionately difficult for poor people, as can the requirement
to attend fixed treatment appointments. People with low paying jobs
are less likely to have flexibility in their work schedules. Missing work
makes them at risk of losing their jobs. They lose money if they lose
work hours. If they have children, they may struggle to pay for a
babysitter. For the poorest probationers, of whom there are many,
finding reliable and affordable transportation to the probation office
or to a treatment program can be an insurmountable hurdle. 73

Doherty also notes that, in contrast to defendants with more
resources, poor defendants will have less power to object to the
manner in which their compliance with these conditions is enforced.74
These probation-focused arguments have equal purchase for poor
defendants facing similar conditions of pretrial release.
In some cases, judges craft alternative conditions of release that
are difficult to justify in terms of managing either flight risk or
dangerousness. In a 2012 op-ed, Dan Markel and Eric Miller
highlighted some particularly egregious examples, including cases
where judges ordered defendants on pretrial release to write book
reports or to take a spouse bowling. 75 In addition to violating Salerno’s
definition of “excessiveness” and inviting obvious policy objections,
imposing unnecessary supervision obligations or other conditions
violates most bail statutes, which direct judges to utilize the least
restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release that will
prevent flight and protect public safety. 76
3. Overreliance on money bail to secure release
The conditions most often used are financial conditions of release,
which are often referred to as different forms of “money bail.” 77
Money bail is particularly problematic because it frequently leads to

73. Id. at 350.
74. Id. at 345.
75. Dan Markel & Eric J. Miller, Opinion, Bowling, as Bail Condition, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/opinion/not-yet-tried-but-sentenced-tored-lobster.html?_r=0.
76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012).
77. Timothy R. Schnacke, former Executive Director of the Pretrial Justice Institute has
written in some detail about the history of the term “bail” and the problems with our modern
association of the term “bail” with money. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 21–35.
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detention instead of securing release. The detention-related critiques
of money bail are outlined in the subsections that follow. As outlined
here, even for defendants who are able to pay for their release, the type
and/or amount of bail imposed can be excessive.
Money bail can take a range of different forms. Sometimes courts
impose unsecured appearance bonds, where a defendant is released
without any up-front payment but agrees to pay a set amount of
money if he or she fails to show up for court. 78 If a friend or family
member makes this promise it is called an unsecured surety bond.79
These underutilized conditions impose financial penalties for failing
to return to court but do not require prepayment for release. More
frequently, however, courts impose more traditional forms of money
bail: requiring defendants to pay some money upfront or to find a
third party (surety) to do so. 80
Even for defendants who are able to make bail and are released
pretrial, there are important problems with the system. There is a
dearth of evidence that money bail is an effective or necessary financial

78. The definitions supplied here and in note 80, infra, are drawn from Schnacke’s helpful
article, see id., and from a summary and chart created by the Justice Policy Institute that
illustrates the range of possible financial conditions that may be imposed. See JUSTICE POLICY
INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR
BAIL 7–9 (Sept. 2012).
79. Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 733 (explaining the perceived role of the
surety as a guarantor of the defendant’s presence: “Because the defendant, presumably, would
not want to punish his sureties he would not flee, and because the sureties would not want to
pay a fine, they would make sure the defendant appeared in court.”).
80. These arrangements can take a number of different forms that are given different
names. For shorthand in this Article and to contrast them to the far less problematic unsecured
bond conditions just discussed, I refer to these prepaid bail arrangements as “money bail.”
Sometimes defendants will be released if they post a partially secured appearance or surety bond
(this is also called a deposit bond), which means that they post a percentage of the total bail
amount (often ten percent) and agree to pay the remainder if they fail to appear. Defendants
may also be released if they post a commercial bond and the bail bondsman posts the full amount
to the court. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 2–3. Some defendants will be required to post
the entire amount in cash; some will be permitted to use credit cards; others may post
collateral (by providing the deed or title to a house or car or other property, for example).
The use of these different forms of bail and bonds will vary according to the jurisdiction and
by judge. See id. at 3–4.
Bail or bond amounts that are posted to the court are typically refunded when the defendant
appears as required. (There may, however, be court fees that are imposed as part of these
transactions.) A defendant who uses a commercial bail bondsman typically pays at least ten
percent of the total bail amount as a nonrefundable fee to the bondsman.
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incentive, particularly given the alternatives that are available. 81 To
justify money bail, studies would need to demonstrate that bail is a
more effective financial incentive than the unsecured bond provisions
described above (or than other non-financial alternatives). None have
done so. 82
Defendants who are able to somehow raise money for their bail
may face excessive financial hardships. Because bail is generally not
calibrated based on a defendant’s ability to pay, “indigent defendants
and their families” who are able to scrape together the funds for
release may be forced “to spend money that otherwise would have
covered basic necessities.” 83 Additionally, in many cases where
defendants are able to gather the resources for their bail, judges use
this to challenge their eligibility for court-appointed counsel. 84 In
other cases where defendants’ incomes exceed those thresholds,
using financial resources to pay bail means having fewer resources to
devote to their legal defense.
4. Detention for poverty
The preceding subsections addressed problems relating to
defendants who are released. Of course, not all defendants are released
before trial. There are two principal means by which defendants wind

81. There is surprisingly no real data that suggests that money bail is an effective flight
risk management tool. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 10–17.
82. Id. at 91–92.
83. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1360.
84. States generally fall into one of three categories for how they consider defendants’
ability to post bond in determining indigency: (1) ability to post bond creates a rebuttable
presumption of nonindigency, (2) ability to post bond is a factor in determining indigency, (3)
ability to post bond is not a consideration in determining indigency. Allison D. Kuhns, If You
Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for You?: How (Some) States Force Criminal
Defendants To Choose Between Posting Bond and Getting a Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1787, 1799–1800 (2012). “[E]ven in states that appear to have a multifactor test, a
defendant’s posting of bond is frequently abused in the indigency determination.” Id. at 1804.
Additionally, “there is evidence that even in [states where a defendant’s ability to post bond is
not a factor in determining his or her indigency] some courts use bond posting as a factor in
determining indigency.” Id. at 1805. The practice of challenging defendants’ eligibility for courtappointed counsel based on their ability to post bail runs counter to ABA guidance. N.Y. STATE
OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING
ASSIGNED COUNSEL ELIGIBILITY 25 (2016) (“The American Bar Association (ABA) has stated
strongly and succinctly that ‘[c]ounsel should not be denied . . . because bond has been or can
be posted.’” (quoting another source)).
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up being detained before trial: (1) a judge may deny bail and order
the defendant to be detained until trial (also known as remanding the
defendant to custody) or (2) a judge may set bail at a sum that the
defendant cannot pay. 85
First, depending on the jurisdiction’s pretrial detention statute,
the judge may deny bail and order detention based on (i) the risk that
the person will not appear for trial (“flight risk”) or, in some cases, (ii)
the person’s risk to public safety (“dangerousness”). Federal and most
state statutes are generally phrased to authorize detention if a judge
finds that there are no conditions of release that can mitigate these
risks. 86 According to the Vera Institute of Justice, this direct route is
the path to pretrial detention for only about one out of every ten
pretrial detainees in state and local jails. 87
The other nine out of ten pretrial detainees identified in the Vera
report follow a second, more indirect path to pretrial detention. 88 If a
judge does not order a defendant to be remanded, the judge may
impose conditions of release (including financial conditions, like bail). 89
If a defendant is unable to satisfy those conditions—most frequently, if
a defendant cannot afford her bail—she will be detained.90
85. Defendants may also end up in custody if they fail to abide by other conditions of release.
86. As explained in more detail in Sections II.A and II.B, “dangerousness” is only a
permissible basis for ordering detention in certain types of cases. For certain categories of
offenses, federal and state statutes create presumptions of dangerousness. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142
(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1) (2012); see also infra notes 166–186 and accompanying text for more detailed
discussion. For similar state provisions, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-533(d), (e) (2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(B), (C) (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1101(D) (2011).
87. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
88. Id. (citing Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf) (“[Thirty-eight] percent of felony defendants will spend the entirety of
their pretrial periods in jail[,]” but within that population, “only one in ten of these defendants
is detained because he or she is denied bail. The rest simply cannot afford the bail amount the
judge sets”).
89. See supra Section I.C.3.
90. Simonson, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that bail for indigent defendants is “the
ballgame”; if they cannot afford bail, defendants suffer myriad costs of pretrial detention).
Practitioners also report cases of defendants whose families might be able to pay bail but elect
not to do so because judges warn (or threaten) that it will jeopardize their access to courtappointed counsel. See Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of
American Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 264 (2015) (“On recent trips to Tennessee,
Alabama, and Missouri, for example, . . . I saw judges routinely inform jailed defendants that
they would refuse to give them a court-appointed lawyer if their families were able to pay a bond
to have them released from jail.”).
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Judicial motives for setting unaffordable bail are not always clear
and that opacity is increased when flight risk and dangerousness are
considered together. There are, however, several possible motives. The
first explanation, which some courts have accepted as reasonable, is that
judges have simply set a price for flight risk. In theory, if we consider
bail in isolation from other conditions of release, when a judge
determines that a defendant’s flight risk mandates a particular bail figure
and the defendant cannot afford that price, detention is warranted. 91 In
practice, however, money bail is not an isolated or singular option.
Judges have a range of additional conditions of release they may impose
instead of money bail or in addition to more modest or affordable
money bail amounts to try to manage flight risk. Given these other
options, judges’ overreliance on monetary bail is legally indefensible.92
There are other possible explanations. Unaffordable bail may also
result from judges’ blind reliance on bail schedules that set bail
amounts according to offenses and do not adjust based on defendants’
resources. It may also be the product of neglect, ignorance, or
overtaxed judges. These explanations do not, of course, resolve the
underlying constitutional and statutory problems.
The negative outcomes for defendants who are jailed before trial
go well beyond the custody itself. 93 For those detained, even short jail
stays jeopardize employment or housing and can create risks that
parents will lose custody of their children. 94 Pretrial detention alters

91. See Michael S. Woodruff, Note, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial Justice
Reform Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 244 (2013) (explaining that courts
have held that unaffordable bail is not necessarily “excessive,” so long as the figure set can be
justified by the risk of flight) (collecting federal circuit cases); see also Wiseman, Discrimination,
supra note 21, at 140, 140 n.104 (explaining that although courts are not required to “set bail
at an amount that defendants can actually afford,” at least two circuits “have held that if the
defendant protests that the trial court has set bail higher than he can pay, the trial court must
provide a reasoned explanation for its arrival at the disputed figure”) (collecting cases).
92. The constitutional and statutory arguments are outlined in detail in Part II, infra.
93. The nature of the jail experience should not be minimized, of course. Jails are known
to be less well-regulated, higher-risk facilities than prisons. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1302
(describing the country’s “rotting jail cells of impoverished defendants—still innocent before
proven guilty” as “the Shadowlands of Justice”); see also David Gorlin, Note, Evaluating
Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement
Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2009).
94. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 18, 22.
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legal outcomes for defendants in troubling ways, too. 95 Those who are
detained before trial are more likely to be convicted and to serve
longer sentences than defendants with comparable risk levels who are
released before trial. 96 Not surprisingly, pretrial detainees—even those
who claim innocence—feel heightened pressure to plead guilty. 97
Money bail’s practical role as a path to detention for the poor is
well documented and it is not a twenty-first century revelation. When
President Lyndon Johnson signed the first Bail Reform Act into law
in 1966, he was optimistic that the statute would fix a money bail
system that he described as “archaic and cruel.” 98 Johnson

95. See Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1353–58 (describing the burdens of pretrial
detention in detail).
96. ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
5
(2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/ 02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf
[hereinafter
ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY]; see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 14
(“While results varied by length of detention and risk level, in virtually every category, those
detained were more likely to be rearrested before trial, to receive a sentence of imprisonment,
to be given a longer term of imprisonment, and to recidivate after sentence completion.”).
97. See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Will
Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, NBER Working Paper No.
22511 (August 2016); Mary T. Phillips, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE
OF
BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012), http://issuu.com/
csdesignworks/docs/decadebailresearch12?e=2550004/5775378 (“The pressure on a jailed
defendant to plead guilty seems a particularly compelling explanation for how detention could
lead to a greater likelihood of conviction. A defendant who is facing a non-custodial sentence
can be released immediately by pleading guilty, whereas holding out for acquittal may mean
spending many more days, weeks, or months behind bars. Moreover, prosecutors may be less
willing to offer postarraignment plea bargains when they already have the leverage of detention
to encourage a guilty plea—resulting in conviction to more severe charges merely because the
defendant could not make bail.”); VERA INST. OF JUST., LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL
OVERCROWDING REDUCTION PROJECT 10 (2011), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/
resources/downloads/LA_County_Jail_Overcrowding_Reduction_Report.pdf (“[S]ome . . .
[in law enforcement] acknowledged that defendants in custody have a greater incentive to plead
than those who are released pretrial, and that this pressure may serve the purpose of settling
cases more quickly.”); see also Karakatsanis, supra note 90, at 264 (describing watching
“hundreds of defendants in minor misdemeanor cases plead guilty without a lawyer just so that
they could finally get out of jail after weeks in custody because they were too poor to pay for
their release pending trial”).
98. Foster, supra note 2 (describing Johnson’s speech); see also Robert Young, Bail
Reform Act is Signed by President, CHI. TRIB. 2 (June 23, 1966),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1966/06/23/page/30/article/bail-reform-act-is-signe
d-by-president.
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acknowledged that “[b]ecause of the bail system, the scales of justice
[were] weighted not with fact nor law nor mercy. They [were]
weighted with money.” 99
Legislatures, other government officials, and courts across the
country have begun to recognize the patent unfairness of detaining
defendants who cannot afford to pay bail. 100 In a series of class action
lawsuits filed over the last year, Equal Justice Under Law, a Washington,
D.C., nonprofit legal services organization, has begun to challenge
money bail systems that do not take account of a defendant’s ability to
pay. 101 As noted supra, the Department of Justice filed a Statement of
Interest in the first such suit in federal court, which challenged money
bail schedules used in Clanton, Alabama. 102 The Statement of Interest
emphasized that, in addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, when bail is set at an amount that does
not “account for a defendant’s indigency,” it stops fulfilling the “central
rationales underlying pretrial detention.” 103 In accepting the parties’
settlement agreement, the Alabama district court declared that the use
of a secured (money) bail to detain an individual following arrest
“without an individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence
and the need for bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”104

99. Id.
100. See infra Section II.B.2 for details about legislative and constitutional changes to end
the use of money bail in New Jersey and similar legislative proposals in other states.
101. Equal Justice Under Law, Ending the American Money Bail System,
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015); see also E-mails from Equal Justice Under Law (Oct. 30, 2015,
11:57 PM), (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:10 PM) (on file with author). Equal Justice Under Law has filed
similar suits in six other states (California, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri),
alleging that individual money bail and pretrial detention systems are unconstitutional. See
Complaint at 2, 10–11, Martinez v. City of Dodge City, No. 15-cv-09344 (D. Kan. Oct. 21,
2015) (alleging that Dodge City, Kansas routinely “refuse[s] to release arrestees from jail unless
they pay a generic and arbitrary ‘bond’ amount”).
102. See DOJ Statement of Interest, supra note 7, at 1 (announcing that “[i]ncarcerating
individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of
fines, fees, or a cash bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
103. Id. at 10–11.
104. Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 15cv34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Sept. 14, 2015).

861

2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/2/16 5:29 PM

2016

Equal Justice Under Law was similarly successful in a challenge to
the use of fixed bail schedules in Velda, Missouri. 105 In June 2015, the
Missouri district court issued an injunction preventing the city from
using secured money bail in any case, and a declaratory judgment
stating that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when an individual
is detained after an arrest because that person cannot afford to post a
monetary bond.106 Equal Justice Under the Law was again successful in
November 2015, when the Southern District of Mississippi declared it
unconstitutional for an individual to be held in custody after an arrest
because the person is too poor to post monetary bond. 107 The
organization also filed a similar lawsuit challenging the money bail
practices of Harris County, Texas, where approximately 6,500 people
(80% of the county jail population) are incarcerated because they cannot
afford to make bail. 108 These legal successes have driven important
reforms to reduce judges’ default reliance on money bail and to end the
sort of wealth-based detention highlighted by the lawsuits.
5. Misuse of money bail: Pretextual preventive detention
It is important, however, to resist the temptation to oversimplify
the problem of unaffordable bail as merely one of finances. Although
it is clear that in some cases judges inadvertently set excessive bail, it
is also well-understood that, in other cases, judges continue to set
unpayable bail figures to manage perceived public safety risks. 109 In a

105. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Pierce v. Velda, No. 15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 2, 2015).
106. Order at 1, Pierce v. Velda, No. 15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015).
107. See Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG-RHW, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 6, 2015).
108. Eesha Pandit, Criminal injustice in Texas: Thousands stay jailed in just one county
because they can’t pay bail—and it’s happening all over the U.S., SALON (June 5, 2016),
http://www.salon.com/2016/06/05/criminal_injustice_in_texas_thousands_stay_jailed_in_j
ust_one_county_because_they_cant_pay_bail_and_its_happening_all_over_the_u_s/.
The
plaintiffs in the Harris County case are three individuals arrested for misdemeanor offenses who
were incarcerated after they could not afford their bail amounts. Id. This includes one pregnant
mother who was arrested and detained for failing to show proper identification. Lise Olsen,
Lawsuit adds pregnant mom who was jailed five days after traffic stop, HOUS. CHRON. (May 24,
2016),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/houston/article/Lawsuit-adds-pregnant-momdetained-five-days-7942253.php?t=d1d8c5d1f1438d9cbb&cmpid=email-premium.
109. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1346 n.2 (explaining that “in some cases[,]
this reflects a judgment [in the form of high bail setting] that the defendants are dangerous, but
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recent article, the New York Times quoted one Baltimore judge who
was “presented with abundant evidence” that a defendant had been
involved with protests. 110 She explained that the defendant was “out
of control and . . . a threat to public safety.” 111 She set his bail at
$500,000 because “there is no way that I can guarantee public safety,
should he make bail.” 112 Another judge stated it plainly: “The bail is
really being set to keep the person in custody. You have to kind of
concede that.” 113
This is the point in the pretrial detention system that seems to
operate most illogically—and where judicial practice diverges most
widely from statutory and constitutional requirements. Thirty-plus
years after federal and state statutes were rewritten to fix this precise
problem by permitting judges to order dangerous defendants to be
detained, money bail is still used as a back-door means to manage
dangerousness, even in cases where there is no serious risk of flight.114
Properly calculated, money bail is set at the precise amount that
will induce a released defendant to return to court (or, conversely, the

in other cases not . . .”). Judges may also set high bail to induce defendants to plead guilty. See
Simonson, supra note 9, at 21–22.
110. Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is Out of Defendant’s Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-of-defendantsreach-other-costs-mount.html [hereinafter Dewan, Defendant’s Reach]. The defendant,
teenager Allen Bullock, was charged with throwing a traffic cone through the windshield of a
police car during an April 2015 protest of the police-related death of Freddie Gray. Justin
Fenton, Teen charged with riot at downtown protest gets 6 months, community service, BALT. SUN
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/in-depth/bsmd-ci-bullock-riot-plea-20160229-story.html.
111. Dewan, Defendant’s Reach, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also, e.g., Associated Press, Memo: Violence long simmered between rival Texas
biker gangs, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD (May 19, 2015), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/
twin-peaks-biker-shooting/memo-violence-long-simmered-between-rival-texas-biker-gangs/ar
ticle_94584d74-fe21-11e4-b1cb-3706e00320a8.html (setting bail at $1 million for subjects in
shootout based on public safety concerns); Sophia Kazmi, Judge sets $3 million bail for suspect in
Livermore road rage killing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_17909960 ($3 million bail for suspect deemed by judge to
be “‘an extreme danger to the community’”).
114. S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), supra note 53 (stating that in 1983, Congress made a
“significant departure” from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act” by empowering courts
to consider a defendant’s dangerousness when making pretrial detention decisions). Even with
this additional power, however, courts still often turn to money bail as a means of managing
dangerousness instead of using the power to detain dangerous defendants awaiting trial as
explained above.
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amount of money that will dissuade a released defendant from fleeing
the jurisdiction). Although there are real debates about how well bail
serves this purpose, there is not much to debate about the purpose of
bail. 115 When priced to ensure detention on the basis of dangerousness,
money bail violates both law and policy. 116
In many jurisdictions, statutes governing the setting of bail
expressly state that the purpose of bail is to ensure appearance. 117 Many
jurisdictions also expressly condition the forfeiture of bail (i.e., the loss
of bail money) on a failure to appear, not on the commission of a new
offense. These provisions are consistent with a long history that makes
clear that money bail is a tool for managing flight risk, not a legitimate
means of managing danger. 118
Suggesting that bail—which is of questionable utility in managing
flight risk, the very risk it was developed to manage—should be
extended to manage public safety risk is also simply illogical. There is
no evidence that threatening to withhold a bail payment if a person
commits a crime while on pretrial release provides any marginal
deterrence value over the existing blanket of criminal sanctions and
penalties that a new crime would trigger. Viewed slightly differently,
if a court views a defendant as being a high risk for committing a new
crime on release, it does not seem appropriate to simply set a high
price for release. Dangerous defendants do not become less dangerous
by paying bail. 119
Whatever path to detention is followed, and whatever rationale
judges might claim drives their decisions, modern studies reinforce
decades-old claims: 120 our jails contain far too many low-risk
detainees. 121 For misdemeanor detainees, there are estimates that as

115. See infra Section II.C.
116. SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (2014) (“[M]oney set with a purpose to detain is
likely unlawful under numerous theories of law, and is also unnecessary given the Supreme
Court’s approval of a lawful detention scheme that uses no money whatsoever.”).
117. See infra Section II.C.
118. See supra Section I.A.
119. SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (“[N]o study has ever shown that money can protect
the public.”).
120. See GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 18 (describing historical criticism
of the effectiveness of bail: “jails appeared to hold a substantial number of defendants who could
be characterized as good release risks”).
121. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 19, at 553 (“[A]bout half of those detained have
a lower chance of being rearrested pretrial than many of the people released.”); Tina Rosenberg,
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many as twenty percent of detainees will not be convicted and some
portion of those who are convicted will not be sentenced to jail time.122
D. Mismeasuring Flight and Danger
Judges’ measurement of pretrial risk factors has long been the
subject of criticism and, therefore, a perennial target of reform
efforts. 123 Dating at least to the Vera Institute of Justice’s Manhattan
Bail Project in the 1960s, bail reformers have studied which factors
best predict which defendants pose a flight risk, and, as statutes have
evolved, which factors correlate to dangerousness. 124 As outlined
below, in recent years this process has shifted from reliance on judges’
relatively subjective evaluations of statutory factors to the growing use
of more objective, actuarial-style measurement tools.
1. Traditional approaches and statutory factors
Legislators have endeavored to guide judicial discretion within the
pretrial detention decision-making process by including predictive
factors in federal and state bail statutes. Those statutory factors
generally fall into the following categories: the “nature and
circumstances” of the charged offense; the “weight of the evidence”
against the defendant; the defendant’s criminal history (including the
defendant’s record of prior appearances at court proceedings); the
defendant’s “character, physical and mental condition” (including any

Putting
Fewer
Innocents
Behind
Bars,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
3,
2015),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/putting-fewer-innocents-behindbars/?_r=0 (“Pretrial detention should be reserved for flight risks or dangers to society. Yet 62
percent of people in jail in America are awaiting trial [up from 40 percent 30 years ago]—and
most are charged with crimes no more dangerous than shoplifting, driving with a suspended
license, public drunkenness, drug possession, missing their curfew or otherwise violating
parole.”); ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY 5, supra note 96 (explaining that, under the
current approach, “too many high-risk defendants go free, and too many low-risk defendants
remain locked up for long periods. These systemic failures put the public in danger and place
unnecessary strain on budgets, jails, law enforcement, families, and communities.”).
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010).
123. Goldkamp & Vilcica, supra note 16, at 116 (“The main explanation for the
limited success of bail reform lies in its failure to engage judges centrally, to make bail
reform ‘judicial’ reform.”).
124. Scott Kohler, Vera Institute of Justice: Manhattan Bail Project, FORD FOUND. (1962),
http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files/descriptive/manhattan_bail_project.pdf.
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substance abuse history); and his or her ties to the jurisdiction
(employment, family, or length of residence). 125 Notably, however, the
statutes do not indicate which factors are relevant to flight risk and
which are believed to predict dangerousness. 126
Traditionally, the information about these statutory factors was
gathered prior to a defendant’s bail hearing. Some of the information
(e.g., the charge, the defendant’s criminal history, and the defendant’s
record of appearances) could be easily obtained from public records.
Information about substance abuse or family ties, on the other hand,
was gathered through an interview with the defendant.
2. Bail schedules
In the past, some states, like California, have gone further:
creating bail schedules that effectively supplant judicial discretion by
setting presumptive dollar amounts for bail that are based exclusively
on the charged offense. 127 These types of bail schedules, which do not
adjust for defendants’ financial resources, have recently come under
attack in a series of lawsuits. 128 As Sam Wiseman explains, chargedriven bail schedules are “the worst sort of ‘actuarial’ instrument, and
their widespread use is an indicator of both how little time judges have

125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (McKinney
Supp. 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.222(C) (LexisNexis 2014); TENN. CODE § 40-11115(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2) (2016). But see Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21,
at 155 (asserting that, although these statutory factors may be relevant to determining what the
right amount of bail is, they will lead to improper discrimination if used by judges to determine the
“threshold question” of who is eligible for bail).
126. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of which release conditions best manage flight
risk or dangerousness.
127. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 5–6 (2009) (describing bail
schedule procedures); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 29 (“In some jurisdictions,
police commanders have the authority to release people directly from the station house using a
bail schedule.”).
128. See supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. Scholars have also been explicit
about the flaws with bail schedules. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 445–46 (“The crime
charged is an extremely rough, singular indicator of likely dangerousness and flight risk
compared to the sophisticated actuarial models deployed elsewhere, and judges augment this
rudimentary predictor only with impressionistic assessments reached after questioning a
defendant for a few minutes, at best.”).
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to devote to pretrial release determinations and how little accuracy
appears to matter in most systems.” 129
3. Data-driven risk assessment tools
Over the last decade, reform efforts have focused on moving away
from reliance on charge-driven bail schedules or judges’ “gut and
intuition” and toward using “rigorous, scientific, data-driven risk
assessments.” 130 Federal courts and courts in New Jersey, Kentucky,
and Colorado, among others, are increasingly employing risk
assessment tools that promise more accurate and efficient risk
calculations to refine judges’ pretrial detention decisions. 131 While in
2015 fewer than ten percent of jurisdictions used “scientifically
validated risk assessments . . . partly because of cost,” that number is
rapidly growing, particularly as less costly tools are being developed.132
a. The federal tool. The Federal Risk Assessment Tool relies on nine
key factors to predict pretrial risk, including (1) “charges pending
against the defendant at the time of arrest,” (2) “number of prior
misdemeanor arrests,” (3) “number of prior felony arrests,” (4)
“number of prior failures to appear,” (5) employment status of
defendant at the time of arrest, (6) defendant’s residency status,
(7) defendant’s substance abuse problems, (8) “nature of the primary
charge,” and (9) if the primary charge is a misdemeanor or a felony.133

129. Id. at 446.
130. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 5.
131. MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, ARNOLD FOUND.,
PRETRIAL
RISK
WITHOUT
A
DEFENDANT
INTERVIEW
(2013),
ASSESSING
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_nointerview_FNL.pdf; Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 233 (2015) (summarizing evolution of risk assessment
tools and observing that automated risk assessment “is enjoying its heyday in criminal justice”).
There are a number of competing risk assessment tools, but studies suggest that, among those
most commonly used, there are not significant differences in their “predictive validity.” NATHAN
JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2015) (citing 2010 study comparing tools that predict violent recidivism)
(discussing theories that explain why the different tools yield the same outcomes).
132. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture With Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-ascience.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Dewan, Judges].
133. Marie VanNostrand et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROB.,
Sept. 2009, at 3, 5.
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Points for each of these risk factors are tallied into a single
comprehensive risk value (lumping risks of flight and dangerousness
together) during pretrial release. 134 This single risk assessment includes
two separate sections, but each section contains factors relevant to
both types of predictions: (i) criminal history and current offense and
(ii) other factors. 135
By 2011, federal judges were relying on the federal risk assessment
tool in about one out of six cases. 136
b. Selected state risk assessment tools. A number of states have
adopted risk assessment tools that are similar to the federal tool. 137 The
Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (“VPRAI”) is one of the
oldest and has served as a model for other states. Like the federal tool,
VPRAI generates one single risk score (which predicts a combined risk
of flight and dangerousness) for a judge to evaluate at a pretrial
detention hearing. 138 VPRAI relies on eight factors that were found to
be statistically significant in predicting pretrial failure. These factors
fall into the same general categories as the federal factors. 139
The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) operates similarly
to the tools used at the federal level and in Virginia, but has twelve
relevant factors. 140 CPAT includes the same factors seen in the federal
134. Id. at 13, 21 (combining failure to appear and dangerousness into one risk figure;
evaluating various alternatives to detention and evaluating whether (and to what extent) the
alternatives would mitigate a combined risk of flight and dangerousness). Although the study of
the federal risk assessment tool combined failure to appear and dangerousness into one risk figure
to be used by a judge evaluating the risks, the study did disaggregate the risks for measuring
outcomes. In other words, the data did note which defendants did not appear for court and
which defendants committed a new crime. Id. at 13.
135. See id.
136. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 421 (citing Timothy P. Cadigan &
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in the Federal Pretrial Services System,
FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 33).
137. For a detailed review of the risk assessment instruments currently being used across
the country, see Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 8–14, appendix, (forthcoming).
138. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA, 8–9 (2009), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/VA%20Risk
%20Report%202009.pdf.
139. Id. at 8.
140. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL 13 (rev.
Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/CO%20Pretrial%20
Assessment%20Tool%20Report%20Rev%20-%20PJI%202012.pdf. The twelve factors include:
“(1) Having a Home or Cell Phone; (2) Owning or Renting One’s Residence; (3) Contributing
to Residential Payments; (4) Past or Current Problems with Alcohol; (5) Past or Current Mental
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assessment and in Virginia, but also adds factors like “having a home
or cell phone” and “owning or renting one’s residence.” 141 As at the
federal level and in Virginia, Colorado defendants are given a single
risk score, which places them into one of four risk categories. 142 Florida
and Ohio employ risk assessment tools that are similar to the Colorado
and Virginia tools. 143
c. The Public Safety Assessment—Court tool. In June 2015, the
Laura and John Arnold Foundation announced a rollout of its
algorithm (the Public Safety Assessment-Court or “PSA-Court”),
which gives each defendant two scores—one for risk of flight and one
for risk of committing a crime while on release. 144 The tool also
highlights those defendants who pose a special risk of violence. 145 The
separation of these risk scores was one of the Foundation’s priorities
from the beginning of the project, and this feature marks a significant
improvement over other tools. 146 The PSA-Court tool is now used in

Health Treatment; (6) Age at First Arrest; (7) Past Jail Sentence; (8) Past Prison Sentence; (9)
Having Active Warrants; (10) Having Other Pending Cases; (11) Currently on Supervision; (12)
History of Revoked Bond or Supervision.” Id.
141. Id.
142. In Colorado, judges seem to be given more information about whether that single
risk score is more predictive of flight risk or danger, but those two risks are, again, not expressed
as separate risk numbers. The defendant’s success rate in each of the categories can be measured
against an average defendant’s score in that category, whether it be public safety, failure to
appear, or a combination of both. Id.
143. See generally JFA INST., FLORIDA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 13
(2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/FL%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Ass
essment%20Report%20%282012%29.pdf; EDWARD LATESSA ET AL., CREATION AND
VALIDATION OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 49 (2009),
http://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_FinalReport.pdf.
144. Dewan, Judges, supra note 132; see also ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST
SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT—COURT IN KENTUCKY 3 (2014),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky-6Month-Report.pdf [hereinafter ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS].
145. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 4; see also ARNOLD
FOUND., RESULTS, supra note 144, at 3.
146. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 3 (explaining that federal
and Virginia tools “present[ed] a single risk level for each defendant, combining—and assigning
equal weight to—the risk that a defendant will fail to appear and the risk that he will reoffend”).
It is important to recognize that this separation of risks was contemplated by bail reformers John
Goldkamp and Michael Gottfredson in their study in the late 1970s to develop bail guidelines
for use in Philadelphia courts. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 100–01. That
study marked the first use of these actuarial-type “prediction instruments.” Id. Goldkamp and
Gottfredson developed, but did not ultimately employ in their study, four separate prediction

869

2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/2/16 5:29 PM

2016

twenty-nine jurisdictions in the United States, including three entire
states: Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey. 147
Part of the appeal of the PSA-Court tool is that it is “designed
to be more economical than existing risk assessments and effective
regardless of location.” 148 According to the Foundation, it is “more
objective, far less expensive, and requires fewer resources to
administer than previous techniques.” 149 The PSA-Court tool
promises these substantial cost savings because it does not require
defendant interviews. 150
The new tool has three separate six-point scales (each ranging
from the lowest level of risk, one, to the highest, six). 151 Two of these
scales produce “dangerousness” predictions: one scale for “new
criminal activity” (which calculates the likelihood that the defendant
will commit [any] new crime while on pretrial release) and one scale
for “new violent criminal activity.” The third scale calculates the risk
of “failure to appear.”
Critics of risk assessment tools highlight a range of potential
problems that the tools present, 152 but their critiques neglect the
problem identified in this Article. With any tool that promises to
improve decision-making, it is imperative to determine how well that
tool maps onto existing legal requirements. Too many of the federal

instruments that generated separate risk measures for failure to appear, rearrest, serious rearrest,
and combined measures. Id.
supra
note
14,
147. ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT,
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/publicsafety-assessment/; see also Dewan, Judges, supra note 132.
148. Dewan, Judges, supra note 132. The tool is locally validated, meaning that the
predictions for a particular jurisdiction are based on local data.
149. ARNOLD FOUND., SAFETY ASSESSMENT, supra note 14.
150. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96; Dewan, Judges, supra
note 132.
151. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96 (“[T]he likelihood of a
negative pretrial outcome increases with each successive point on the scale.”).
152. For more detailed analyses and critiques of these tools, see, e.g., Melissa Hamilton,
Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 242–
71 (2015) (analyzing evidence-based sentencing schemes and determining that the use of
socioeconomic and demographic variables to contribute to a defendant’s sentence may violate
the equal protection and due process clauses); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the
Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 851 (2014) (critiquing
existing evidence-based regimes and urging approaches that would “base actuarial prediction
only on crime characteristics and criminal history” and that would strip “demographic and
socioeconomic factors”); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 392–93 (2006).
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and state risk assessment tools merge the analysis of flight risk and
dangerousness into a single risk assessment calculation, the PSA-Court
risk assessment tool being a notable exception. Because of this
problem, these tools run the risk of reinforcing (instead of correcting)
problematic judicial practices. The following Part outlines the legal
and policy reasons that flight risk must be measured independently
of dangerousness.
II. DISENTANGLING FLIGHT FROM DANGER: LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS
Judges making pretrial decisions often merge the risk of
dangerousness with the risk of flight. Perhaps as a result, reformers
(including many of those developing actuarial risk prediction models)
also merge these risks. Why is combining the risks problematic? This
Article asserts that flight risk and danger must be analyzed separately
both because of legal requirements (outlined in this part) and for
policy reasons (examined in Part III).
The first reason that flight risk must be measured and evaluated
independently of dangerousness is that the federal and state laws
governing pretrial detention and release (that were described in broad
strokes in Section I.D) frequently require separate consideration of
these distinct risks. As outlined in detail in the sections that follow,
these legal requirements are the product of both (i) constitutional and
statutory limitations on the circumstances in which pretrial detention
can be ordered by a judge and (ii) constitutional and statutory
provisions governing the imposition of bail or other conditions of
release. This Part addresses both types of restrictions in turn,
highlighting aspects of these provisions that explicitly and implicitly
require independent risk assessment.
A. Constitutional Constraints
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Bail Reform Act in its 1987 decision in United States v.
Salerno. 153 The Salerno Court viewed the word “excessive” to be doing
important work in the bail clause. 154 As the Salerno Court explained:
153. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
154. See Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1383 (“Salerno did not completely empty
the clause of content: regardless of what ends are permissible, ‘excessive’-ness clearly implies an
inquiry into the relationship between those ends and the means employed to achieve them.”).
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The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be
“excessive” in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to determine
whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must compare
that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect
by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has
admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set
by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more. 155

This inquiry into “excessiveness” requires the government to be
explicit about the risks it seeks to manage and precise in proposing
restrictions (detention or conditions of release) to respond to those
risks. Separation of flight risk and dangerousness will be essential to
this inquiry. The dearth of successful excessive bail claims in the
decades since Salerno suggest that the limits of the statutes and the
Salerno decision are not well understood. 156
B. Ordering Detention: Statutory Limitations
Under the federal Bail Reform Act and in nearly all states, when a
judge determines that no combination of release conditions will
adequately manage flight risk and danger, he or she is empowered to
order that a defendant be detained until trial. Because federal and state
statutes often pair flight risk and danger together, 157 there is a
conventional misconception that both types of risks are relevant for
every type of determination made under these detention provisions.
The provisions of federal and state detention statutes, however, clearly

155. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754.
156. See Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (explaining that despite the holding’s clear limitations, “Salerno was widely
perceived as a robust endorsement of pretrial preventive detention and lesser forms of preventive
restraint”); see also Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1384 (“A richer jurisprudence of
excessiveness is needed.”). Although the Salerno’s “excessive bail” analysis has not been revisited,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited Salerno in support of other facial challenges to statutes,
see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) (“The fact that [a law] might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render
it wholly invalid”), and occasionally to reiterate that “[e]nsuring public safety” is “a fundamental
regulatory goal,” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 108 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
157. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (repeatedly pairing the court’s obligation to “assure the
appearance” of a defendant with its obligation to protect “the safety of any other person or the
community”); KY § 431.525 (pairing “flight risk” and “danger”); 15 M.R.S.A. § 1002 (pairing
appearance and safety).
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call for segregated risk assessment. Those provisions are addressed in
the following subsections.
1. Ordering pretrial detention after Salerno: Modern federal
statutory requirements
There are at least three aspects of the detention provisions of the
federal Bail Reform Act that require independent risk analysis. Those
include provisions that (i) outline the government’s burden of proof,
(ii) indicate when a detention hearing may be held, and (iii) restrict
the scope of a detention hearing. While the federal pretrial reports that
judges rely upon to make bail determinations do separate these risks,
the federal risk assessment tool curiously does not. 158
The first statutory distinction between flight risk and
dangerousness relates to the government’s burden of proof. The
government’s burden of proof for preventive (i.e., danger-based)
detention—clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness—is
higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that has been
applied to flight risk determinations. 159 As outlined in Part I, this
heightened standard of proof of danger was one of the reasons that
the Salerno Court specifically cited for upholding the constitutionality
of the Bail Reform Act. 160 If the standards of proof for the two types
of risks are different, the risks must be analyzed separately.
A second and less obvious requirement to distinguish between
flight and danger emerges from the cases decided since Salerno. Lower
federal courts are split on how the dangerousness and flight risk
provisions of the Bail Reform Act interact with each other, particularly
as they relate to a district court’s decisions (i) to hold a detention
hearing and (ii) to order detention. Although flight risk can be
grounds for a detention order in any federal case, most courts have
held that dangerousness may only be grounds for detention under the
circumstances specified in the statute.
158. See supra Section I.D.3.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (“The facts the judicial officer uses to support a
finding . . . that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of
any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”).
Although the statute is silent on the government’s burden of proof for flight risk, several courts
have agreed that it is a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Himler, 797
F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986).
160. See supra Section I.B.3; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751–52.

873

2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/2/16 5:29 PM

2016

The Third Circuit in United States v. Himler was the first court to
consider this issue. 161 Himler was charged with crimes involving the
production of false identification documents and the government
argued that he posed a serious risk of flight and should be detained.162
Given both Himler’s criminal history (he had a prior larceny
conviction and was on probation for possession of false identification
when arrested for the current crime) and the nature of the current
charge, the district court determined that he had experience in
adopting a false identity. 163 For that reason, in the district court’s view,
Himler posed both a serious flight risk and a danger to the community
and was ordered detained until trial. 164
The key issue for the Third Circuit on appeal was whether the
district court properly relied on the defendant’s risk to public safety in
ordering detention. 165 The district court had blended the two risks—
flight and public safety—to justify its ruling. The court’s decision
turned on the operation of two provisions of the federal statute.
Section 3142(e) 166 authorizes a judge to order pretrial detention, but
specifies that the detention order may only be issued “after a hearing
pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f).” 167 The provisions
enumerated in Section 3142(f)(1) permit detention for dangerousness
only in cases that involve crimes of violence, offenses with potential
sentences of life imprisonment or death, certain narcotics offenses,
offenders with two or more serious prior convictions, crimes involving
minor victims, and crimes involving weapons. 168

161. 797 F.2d 156 (1986). The Himler Court addressed this issue before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Salerno was issued. It primarily relied on legislative history to interpret the
statute, while later circuit courts cited legislative history and Salerno. Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP.
NO. 98-225, at 6–7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189) (reviewing the
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act).
162. Id. at 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 160–61.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012).
167. Subsection (f) has two provisions. The first provision addresses when certain types of
crimes (viewed as posing higher public safety risks) will trigger a detention hearing. That
provision is the focus of the next several paragraphs. The second provision of subsection (f)
permits a detention hearing to be held to manage other potential risks (including flight risk) and
that provision is discussed next. See infra notes 180–190 and accompanying text.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). On the government’s motion, a detention hearing may be
held in these cases. Id. For a critique of these and other statutory presumptions that drug offenses
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The Himler court held that “the requisite circumstances for
invoking a detention hearing . . . serve to limit the types of cases in
which detention may be ordered prior to trial.”169 According to the
court, this narrow reading was required because, based on its review
of the legislative history, the drafters of the Bail Reform Act intended
the statute’s preventive detention provisions to apply narrowly to “a
small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants.” 170
For other types of crimes not listed in subsection (f)(1), including,
for example, the false identification charge in Himler and the bank
fraud and false statements charges considered by the First Circuit in a
similar case, 171 a detention hearing may not be held and, consequently,
a defendant may not be detained for dangerousness. In other words,
for less serious crimes that are not specified in the statute, a
defendant’s danger to the community cannot justify detention under
the Act. 172 In those cases, then, a federal court making a pretrial
detention decision must have an independent assessment of flight risk
because that is the only risk that could justify detention. The First,
Second, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all
followed the Third Circuit’s approach in Himler. 173
predict future violence, see Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 254
(2015) [hereinafter Baradaran, Drugs] (“[S]ometimes there is a blanket presumption by courts
and legislatures that where there are drugs, guns will be found and inevitably violence—without
empirical backing or an individual showing based on particularized facts. This blanket
presumption by courts and legislatures that drugs cause violence is separated from the empirical
reality and disconnected from the wealth of social science research . . . .”).
169. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 20 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3203).
170. Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3189). The list of offenses that can trigger detention for dangerousness have broadened
since Himler was decided. In 2006, the statute was amended and subsection (f)(1)(e) was added.
Under the amended language, felonies involving weapons or children can trigger a detention
hearing. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 216,
120 Stat. 587 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(e).
171. United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 9, 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating defendant’s
charges, including conspiracy to make false statements on a mortgage loan application, making
false statements to a national bank, willful misapplication of bank funds, bank fraud, a narcotics
offense, interstate transportation of stolen property, unlawful structuring of a financial
transaction, and a claim by the government that defendant had plotted to kill his girlfriend’s
husband were not deemed to trigger detention hearing).
172. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160.
173. Ploof, 851 F.2d at 11 (holding that a person’s threat to the safety of any other person
or the community, in the absence of one of the statutorily specified circumstances, cannot justify
detention under the Act); United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987, 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (same);
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Although the United States Attorney’s Manual expresses the
majority rule as the standard, 174 the government has occasionally
argued for, and at least two district courts have adopted, a different
interpretation: that Section 3142(f) is not exhaustive and merely
mandates when the government must be given a hearing. 175 Under
this view, which contradicts the majority approach, judges have the
option to hold a detention hearing and order detention even in cases
that do not fall within the provisions of Section 3142(f). 176
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this issue, but its
earlier holding in Salerno provides strong support for the majority
view. 177 In upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act, the
Salerno Court explicitly held that the Act was sufficiently protective of
individual liberty interests because it was limited in reach. In the
Court’s words, the Act was constitutional because of “Congress’
careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be

United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Byrd, 969
F.2d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.
1988) (same). The majority of district courts that have addressed the issue have also followed
this approach.
Because of later statutory amendments that broadened the categories of offenses that could
trigger detention for dangerousness, see supra note 170, the felon-in-possession charges in Twine
and Singleton and the child pornography charges in Byrd and Friedman would come out
differently under the current statute. See Twine, 344 F.3d at 987 (defendant’s charge [felon in
possession of a firearm] did not trigger detention hearing); Singleton, 182 F.3d at 9 (same);
Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109–10 (defendant’s child pornography possession charge did not trigger
detention hearing); Friedman, 837 F.2d at 49 (defendant’s child pornography charges did not
trigger detention hearing).
174. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RELEASE AND DETENTION PENDING JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS,
26
CRIMINAL
RESOURCE
MANUAL
(1997),
http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-26-release-and-detention-pendingjudicial-proceedings-18-usc-3141-et.
175. United States v. Megahed, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245–49 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
(holding that § 3142(f) does not limit the circumstances under which a defendant may be
detained); see also United States v. Ritter, No. 2:08po00031-35, 2008 WL 345832, at *1–2
(W.D. Va. 2008) (following the Megahed approach).
176. Id. Although these two district courts (in Megahed and Ritter) have held that
detention is not limited to the circumstances in § 3142(f), several district courts in their same
circuits have agreed with Himler, Ploof, Friedman, and Byrd. See Holmes, 438 F. Supp. 2d at
1344–51; United States v. Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2005); United
States v. DeBeir, 16 F. Supp. 2d 592, 593 (D. Md. 1998); United States v. Allen, 409 F. Supp.
2d 622, 625 (D. Md. 2006).
177. See supra Section II.A.
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permitted.” 178 The Court elaborated that the Act “operates only on
individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely
serious offenses” and that “Congress specifically found that these
individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in
the community after arrest.” 179 Under the majority view, then, at least
in certain types of cases, flight risk must be measured separately
because it is the only type of risk that can trigger a detention hearing.
A third set of cases also requires independent assessment of flight
risk: cases where a detention hearing is statutorily authorized because
a defendant poses a “serious” risk of flight. 180 Here again, Section
3142(e) of the statute states that a judge may issue a detention order
only “after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f).”181
In the category of cases just discussed, the relevant provision is
subsection (f)(1), which permits a detention hearing for certain types
of more serious crimes. 182 Section 3142(f)(2)(A) also permits a court
to hold a detention hearing “in a case that involves . . . a serious risk
that such person will flee.” 183
The question in these cases is whether, when flight risk is what
triggers a detention hearing, a court can consider public safety risk at
the hearing as well. 184 Courts also differ about the scope of these flight
hearings. The prevailing approach is that the specific authorization for
the detention hearing must be the basis for the court’s detention

178. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
179. Id. at 750.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (2012) (allowing a court to hold a detention hearing [on
a motion from the government or on the court’s own motion] “in a case that involves . . . a
serious risk that [the defendant] will flee”). Compare Himler, 797 F.2d at 159–60, with Holmes,
438 F. Supp. 2d at 1344–51.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see supra notes 167 and 168 and accompanying text, describing
the two provisions of subsection (f).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).
183. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A). Subsection (f)(2)(B) also includes some obstruction of justice
provisions (but it does not permit broad consideration of public safety risk). It permits the court
to consider detention for a defendant when faced with “a serious risk that such person will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten,
injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
184. To be clear, if both risks are present and, based on the statute, both risks are legitimate
bases for detention, then both risks can be considered together by a judge making a decision
whether to detain.
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decision. 185 Under this view, if the hearing is held because the
defendant is a serious flight risk (and if the offense of arrest does not
fall within the public safety risk categories outlined in subsection (f)(1)
of the statute), then these courts would only permit detention to be
justified based on flight risk. 186
This issue was also first addressed by Himler, which held that when
the hearing is held pursuant to a defendant’s risk of flight, “[a]ny
danger . . . he may present to the community may be considered only
in setting conditions of release.” 187 In other words, if flight risk is the
trigger for the hearing, then the defendant may not be ordered
detained based on dangerousness; he may only be detained on the
basis of flight. 188 This aspect of Himler has also been adopted by most
other federal courts that have addressed the issue. 189 The First Circuit,
following suit in Ploof, explained that the more narrow view of the
statute was consistent with both the legislative history and with
Salerno. 190 The takeaway from these cases is strict adherence to the
statute’s division of these risks. Proof of a serious flight risk can justify
detention in any kind of case. Danger can only justify detention in the
more serious cases specified in the statute.
185. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160; Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1261–64; DeBeir, 16 F. Supp.
2d at 595; United States v. LaLonde, 246 F. Supp. 2d 873, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2003); ChavezRivas, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 967–68; United States v. Dodge, 842 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D.
Conn. 1994).
186. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160.
187. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160 (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Friedman, 837 F.2d at 49; Ploof, 851 F.2d at 10–12; Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at
1261–64; DeBeir, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 595; LaLonde, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 875; Chavez-Rivas, 536
F. Supp. 2d at 967–68; Dodge, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 645. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Byrd, held that it is “in agreement with the First and Third Circuits.” United States v. Byrd, 969
F.2d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant’s threat to safety of other person or to the
community, standing alone, will not justify pre-trial detention.”). Lower courts applying Byrd,
however, have reached conflicting results. Compare, e.g., Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 with
Holmes, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (interpreting Byrd to hold that § 3142(f) only establishes when
a hearing is authorized, and once met, the defendant can be detained on dangerous alone). This
may be due, in part, to the Fifth Circuit’s own discomfort with the Byrd holding. The Byrd court
acknowledged that it “may be surprising . . . that even after a hearing, detention can be ordered
only in certain designated and limited circumstances, irrespective of whether the defendant’s
release may jeopardize public safety.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109–10.
190. Ploof, 851 F.2d at 10–12 (holding that the language of § 3142(e)–(f) require that the
basis for the detention must be based on the specific authorization for the hearing; detention
based solely on a finding of future dangerous is only authorized when a hearing is held pursuant
to § 3142(f)(1)).
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Properly interpreted, then, there are multiple aspects of the
detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act that require separate
consideration of flight risk and danger. Many state statutes contain
similar provisions, as discussed in the next subsection.
2. State statutes authorizing judges to order pretrial detention
Like the federal statute, many states permit preventive pretrial
detention for individuals who have been arrested for certain more
serious crimes. 191 Some states even require detention in certain cases. 192
New Jersey was an exception to this rule until recently. In 2014,
New Jersey made comprehensive changes to its state bail laws. The
legislature passed a statute that shifts away from reliance on money
bail 193 and voters approved a constitutional amendment to permit
detention based on public safety concerns. 194
New York continues to be an outlier by prohibiting judges from
making discretionary decisions to deny bail based on public safety
concerns. 195 But that does not mean that there is not preventive
191. See, e.g, VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 7553 (2009) (“A person charged with an offense
punishable by life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is great may be held without bail.”);
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (outlining situations [involving certain serious felonies] where courts
may deny bail); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-510 (Supp. 2015) (empowering courts to deny bail for
certain violent offenses); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11a (same).
192. These are typically cases involving capital crimes. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 765.5 (West 2000) (“No person charged with treason or murder shall be admitted to bail if
the proof of his guilt is evident or the presumption great.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All
persons shall be bailable . . . except for a person who is charged with a capital offense where the
proof is evident or the presumption great . . . .”).
193. 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31 (2014) (West) (including several new provisions
that shift away from monetary bail).
194. Public Question Results, supra note 10 (amending constitution to eliminate
constitutional right to bail and to permit judges to order pretrial detention based on public safety
concerns). As amended, New Jersey Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 11 reads, in part:
All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. Pretrial release may
be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary bail, nonmonetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and nonmonetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when
required, or protect the safety of any other person or the community, or prevent the
person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process.
The provision had previously stated: “All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.”
N.J. STAT. ANN. CONST. ART. 1, ¶ 11 (repealed 2014).
195. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2012) (stating that judges
setting bail “must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to
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pretrial detention in New York; for some serious felonies, as a matter
of law, defendants are ordered detained until trial. 196 For other
offenses, however, New York judges are not permitted to consider a
defendant’s risk of dangerousness in making discretionary pretrial
detention decisions. 197 And yet they do.
In 2015, legislation was introduced that would permit judges to
consider an individual’s potential danger to the community when
deciding whether to detain an individual. 198 Those proposed changes
have not been adopted, but they have been supported by different
state and local officials, including, perhaps surprisingly, progressive
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio. 199 For now, New York judges
continue to be limited to considering flight risk in making
discretionary detention and release determinations.
In a range of state and federal cases, separate consideration of
flight risk and dangerousness is necessary for a judge to determine
secure [the defendant’s] court attendance when required”; the discretionary bail statute does
not permit decisions based on public safety); see also People ex rel. Ryan v. Infante, 485 N.Y.S.2d
852, 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985) (citing § 510.30(2)(a) and noting “that the purpose
of bail is to secure the defendant’s appearance at all proceedings before the court”) (internal
citation omitted); People v. Maldonado, 407 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (Crim. Ct. 1978) (“The
statutory structure as to bail is quite clear in that requiring the defendant’s appearance is the
major consideration in fixing the amount of bail. Danger to the community does not appear to
be the primary concern of the bail structure.”).
196. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(b) (“Determinations of applications for
recognizance or bail are not in all cases discretionary but are subject to rules, prescribed in article
five hundred thirty and other provisions of law relating to specific kinds of criminal actions and
proceedings, providing . . . that [in some cases an application] must as a matter of law be denied
and the principal committed to or retained in the custody of the sheriff . . . .”).
197. See supra note 195.
198. S. 5167, 2015 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (The proposed amendments provide
that “[w]ith respect to any principal, the court must consider the kind and degree of control or
restriction that is necessary to secure his or her court attendance when required and to assure the
safety of any other person or the community”) (emphasis added).
199. Mayor de Blasio’s support was announced in the wake of the murder of a five-year
veteran officer of the New York Police Department by an individual who had been released prior
to trial. See A.J. Baker & J. David Goodman, Suspect in Fatal Shooting of New York Officer Was
on the Run for Weeks, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/nyregion/new-york-police-officer-randolph-holderfatally-shot-east-harlem.html. The defendant was on bail at the time of the shooting and had
most recently been arrested for a drug sale charge in late 2014. Id. Following the officer’s death,
de Blasio expressed outrage at a press conference that the defendant had been sent to a drug
rehabilitation program rather than traditionally incarcerated. De Blasio Calls For Changes In State
Bail, Diversion Programs In Wake Of Officer’s Death, CBS N.Y. (Oct. 23, 2015),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015/10/23/de-blasio-diversion-program-changes/.
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whether denying bail and ordering detention is appropriate. In other
words, in some cases, flight risk alone must be measured before
detention may be ordered. As explained in the next Section, statutes
governing the setting or pricing of bail also require independent
risk analysis.
C. Federal and State Provisions Governing the Imposition of Bail
This Article has already made the logical argument that money bail
should not be set to manage dangerousness. 200 As this Section makes
clear, the provisions of the federal bail statute and many state bail
statutes reflect that logic. They describe money bail as a tool for
managing flight risk—not dangerousness. Courts setting bail
amounts, then, must have an estimate of flight risk that is independent
of dangerousness.
Although part (c) of the federal Bail Reform Act describes
generally the court’s power to set conditions of release that will both
assure a defendant’s appearance and protect the community, not all of
the provisions in the list are intended to manage both flight risk and
danger. 201 The money bail provisions are explicitly flight-focused,
stating that the money or property to be used as bail must be set at a
value that the court deems is “reasonably necessary to assure the
appearance of the person as required.” 202
Federal bail forfeiture provisions reinforce this interpretation of
the purpose of bail. Forfeiture of federal bail or bond is triggered by
nonappearance, not by the commission of a new crime on release.203

200. See supra Section I.C.5.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2012).
202. Id. § 3142. The statutes are less clear about the purposes of the other conditions of
release, but there are clear policy reasons for associating many conditions of release with one risk
or the other. As a result, those provisions are discussed in the next Part of the Article. See infra
Section III.D.
203. The bail statute outlines penalties for both failing to appear, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a),
and for committing an offense while on release, § 3147. The provision for failing to appear
provides an affirmative defense if there are “uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person
from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such
circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the
person appeared or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.” § 3146(c). These
penalty provisions make clear that defendants only lose bail or appearance bond for failure to
appear. Section 3147 is silent about loss of bail or appearance bond. So while a new crime will
trigger a penalty per § 3147, it does not mean that bail money is forfeited.
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As a result, when a federal judge sets a bail amount, only flight risk is
a relevant and legitimate consideration for bail. As such, mixing
dangerousness into the risk calculus will likely lead to an excessive (and
therefore unconstitutional) bail amount. 204
State statutes take a range of approaches to outlining the purposes
of bail. Some state statutes are similar to the federal statute: they state
explicitly that the purpose of bail is to secure a defendant’s appearance,
in other words, to manage flight risk. 205 Some states qualify this slightly
by stating that the appearance is the primary, but not necessarily
exclusive purpose of bail. 206
Many states merge the description of the purpose of setting a
specific bail amount with other decisions that are made at a bail
hearing, such as a decision to deny bail or to impose other conditions
of release. 207 In this way, many statutes do a poor job of guiding judges

204. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
205. See ARK. CODE § 17-19-101 (2010) (bail is “for the appearance of the defendant”);
DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 2107 (2015) (“the court shall not require oppressive bail but shall require
such bail as reasonably will assure the reappearance of the accused”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 804-1
(1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2902 (Supp. 2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 311;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 20D (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.1 (West 2000)
(explaining that a “recognizance for the appearance of an accused person may be taken”)
(emphasis added); MISS. CODE § 99-5-25 (2015); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney
Supp. 2016) (a recognizance for the appearance of an accused person may be taken); Lemme v.
Langlois, 104 R.I. 352, 356 (1968) (“The object of bail in a criminal case is to assure the
presence in court of the accused for trial.”).
206. See, for example, Alabama. ALA. CODE § 15-13-102 (2011) (“Definitions and
purpose of bail”—“The primary purpose of bail is to procure the release of a person charged
with an offense upon obtaining assurance, with or without security, of the defendant’s future
appearance in court.”).
207. See Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West) (“Release before trial”); Arizona,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961 (Supp. 2016) (“Offenses not bailable; purpose, preconviction;
exceptions”), invalidated in part by Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (2016); California, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016) (“Setting, reducing or denying bail;
considerations”—“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into
consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at trial or at a
hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the primary consideration.”); Florida, FLA. STAT.
§ 903.046(1) (2016) (“The purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure
the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and to protect the
community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant.”); Illinois, 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-5 (West Supp. 2016) (“Determining the amount of bail and
conditions of release”—discussing the factors a court may consider when it “determin[es] the
amount of monetary bail or conditions of release, if any, which will reasonably assure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and
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about which risks are relevant to different pretrial decisions. Public
safety risks are often woven into these definitions because they
frequently drive either (i) the denial of bail or (ii) the imposition of
other conditions of release.
While danger is clearly relevant to a decision to deny bail or to
impose certain conditions of release, it is illogical to suggest that bail
should be priced according to danger. 208 Nevertheless, some state
statutes do seem to authorize courts to calculate bail to manage public
safety risk. In California, the statute explicitly says that “[i]n setting,
reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into
consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the
offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and
the probability of his or her appearing at trial or at a hearing of the
case.” 209 The statute goes on to emphasize that “[t]he public safety
shall be the primary consideration.” 210 Similarly, in Maine and Kansas,
the applicable statutes permit the imposition of bail to manage public
safety risk, as well as flight. 211 Although the commission of a new crime

the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of bail”); Iowa, IOWA
CODE § 811.2 (2016) (“Conditions of release—penalty for failure to appear”); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (“Bail bond” defined); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 431.525 (West Supp. 2016) (“Conditions for establishing amount of bail”); Minnesota,
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02 (West 2010) (“Release by Court or Prosecutor”); Missouri, MO. SUP.
CT. R. 33.01 (West 2002) (“Misdemeanors or Felonies—Right to Release—Conditions”);
Montana, MONT. CODE § 46-9-106 (2015) (“Release or detention of defendant pending trial”);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901 (2014) (“Bail; personal recognizance; conditions”); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West Supp. 2016) (“Pretrial release decision; timing;
considerations; non-monetary conditions; monetary bail”); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §
10.21.010 (2016) (“Intent”); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-2 (LexisNexis 2014)
(“Bail defined”); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 969.01 (2013–2014) (“Eligibility for release”).
208. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West) (“Setting, reducing or denying bail;
considerations”); see also Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 1–2 (2008) (describing California’s statute and asserting that it gives judges an
impossible task “because there is no relationship between the dollar amount of bail and any in
terrorem inhibiting effect that would deter future criminal conduct by the defendant”).
210. § 1275(a)(1) (West).
211. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1026 (West) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial
condition that, either alone or in combination with other conditions of bail, is in excess of that
reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time and place required,
to ensure that the defendant will refrain from any new criminal conduct, to ensure the integrity
of the judicial process or to ensure the safety of others in the community.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-2802 (Supp. 2015) (“Any person charged with a crime shall . . . be ordered released pending
preliminary examination or trial upon the execution of an appearance bond in an amount
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does not seem to trigger bail forfeiture in Maine, the violation of
public safety-related conditions of release that were imposed in
addition to money bail will trigger forfeiture of that bail. 212
New Jersey’s recently amended bail statute avoids the potential for
this type of confusion by directly specifying that the purpose of
monetary bail is “to reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s
appearance” 213 and by expressly forbidding the use of money bail to
manage public safety (or for other non-flight purposes):
The court shall not impose the monetary bail to reasonably assure
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community
or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct
the criminal justice process, or for the purpose of preventing the
release of the eligible defendant. 214

Even in those states where bail statutes do not clearly state or
isolate the purposes of bail, the purpose can be derived by looking at
bail forfeiture provisions. When forfeiture of bail is triggered by nonappearance only and not by the commission of a new offense during
release, that is a clear reflection of the purpose of bail. 215 In New York
and most other jurisdictions, bail is forfeited by the defendant’s failure
to appear or flight and not by the commission of a new crime
during release. 216

specified by the magistrate and sufficient to assure the appearance of such person before the
magistrate when ordered and to assure the public safety.”).
212. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1094 (“When a defendant who has been admitted to either
preconviction or post-conviction bail in a criminal case fails to appear as required or has violated
the conditions of release, the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.”).
213. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2015).
214. Id. § 2A:162-17(3)(c)(1) (2014).
215. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (2014) (“[I]n virtually every American
jurisdiction, financial conditions of bail bonds cannot even be forfeited for new crimes or other
breaches in public safety, making the setting of a money bond for public safety irrational.”).
216. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(10) (McKinney 2009) (“‘Cash bail’ means a sum
of money . . . posted by a principal or by another person on his behalf . . . upon the condition
that such money will become forfeit to the people of the state of New York if the principal does
not comply with the directions of a court requiring his attendance at the criminal action or
proceeding involved or does not otherwise render himself amenable to the orders and processes
of the court.”); see also, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 41(h)(1) (2014) (“If the person released on
bail on the giving or pledging of security fails to appear before a court or a judicial officer as
required, the judge or magistrate judge before whom the person released was to appear shall
forfeit the security.”); FLA. STAT. § 903.26(2)(b) (2016) (“Failure of the defendant to appear at
the time, date, and place of required appearance shall result in forfeiture of the bond.”); IOWA
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In many states and at the federal level, then, setting bail to manage
public safety risks violates the statutory purpose of bail as expressed in
both “purpose” and “forfeiture” provisions. Again, in these
jurisdictions, if bail is set at a figure higher than necessary to manage
flight risk, it should be viewed as “excessive” and therefore
unconstitutional. 217 While this has not traditionally been a successful
course for defendants, the statutes direct that it should be.
Furthermore, federal and state bail statutes also empower judges
to impose conditions of release other than bail to “reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.” 218 Many of the other available conditions
of release that judges are authorized by statute to impose are also
better for managing either flight risk or danger and are not equally
useful for both. 219 As outlined in more detail in Section III.D below,
the choice of which conditions to impose must—for policy reasons—
be guided by the type (and degree) of risk that is present.
III. ISOLATING FLIGHT FROM DANGER: POLICY ARGUMENTS AND
PROPOSALS
As outlined in Part II, federal and state statutory provisions
frequently require that flight risk be considered independently of
danger. Even when the statutes do not expressly require separate
consideration of risks and even in cases where both risks are present,
flight and danger must be considered separately by judges for several
policy reasons. First, combining the risks may lead to inaccurate
calculations and/or overestimation of both kinds of risks. The second
reason for isolating flight risk from danger is that forcing separate
analyses of pretrial risks may help limit judicial discretion in ways that
CODE § 311.6(1) (2016) (“If the defendant fails to appear at the time and place when the
defendant’s personal appearance is lawfully required, or to surrender in execution of the
judgment, the court must direct an entry of the failure to be made of record, and the undertaking
of the defendant’s bail, or the money deposited, is thereupon forfeited.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
276, § 20F (2015) (“If the accused is admitted to bail, and fails to appear and surrender himself
according to the conditions of his bond or undertaking, such court or justice, by proper order,
shall declare the bond or undertaking forfeited.”). Arizona courts have interpreted Arizona
statutes in the same way. See, e.g., State v. Surety Ins. Co., 622 P.2d 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that defendant’s commission of new crimes while on pretrial release did not trigger
forfeiture of surety bond).
217. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012).
219. For a longer discussion of these conditions, see infra Section III.D.
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provide judges with necessary political cover (thus alleviating pressure
for judges to err on the side of detention). In addition, analyzing these
risks separately will improve the feedback that judges receive about
their release decisions. Finally, courts can devise and impose a range
of conditions of release to mitigate pretrial risks, many of which do
not manage both flight and danger (at least not to the same degree).
Each of these policy arguments is outlined in more detail in the
sections that follow.
A. Separating Risks to Avoid Overestimation
The first practical justification for separating flight risk from
dangerousness is that merging the two risks may contribute to
inaccurate risk measurements. At the outset, judges should evaluate
these risks separately simply as a matter of statistical precision.
Furthermore, judicial efforts to calculate risks are vulnerable to
well-documented cognitive biases or distortions. As outlined below,
requiring separate consideration of flight risk and dangerousness may
reduce judges’ overreliance on problematic intuitive calculations.
Scholars have researched and written extensively about two
systems that govern our decision-making or reasoning processes.220
The first, our intuitive system, operates on a subconscious level,
processing information quickly and with little effort. 221 By contrast,
our deliberative system requires “effort, motivation, concentration,
and the execution of learned rules.” 222 While reliance on our intuitive
system is essential because we need to make so many rapid and
efficient “decisions” as we navigate our days, the shortcuts taken by
the intuitive system (also called heuristics) are vulnerable to
distortion. 223 As Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinksi, and Andrew
220. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974).
221. See id.; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011); see also Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich,
Blinking] (describing the intuitive system as “spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast”).
222. Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 31.
223. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 220, at 1127; Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich,
Blinking, supra note 221, at 31 (“[I]ntuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable
influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.”); cf. Alex
Stein, Behavioral Probability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2014).
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Wistrich have shown, even judges are vulnerable to these
distortions. 224 Judges tend to “favor compelling intuitive reactions
over careful deliberative assessments—even when the intuitive
reactions are clearly wrong.” 225
The distortions or biases described above may be amplified in
situations like bail hearings where “the law is unclear, the facts are
disputed, or judges possess wide discretion.” 226 Judges may also
overestimate pretrial risks—dangerousness in particular—because they
rely on what is called the “availability heuristic” which is the “tendency
to measure the probability of an event ‘by the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.’” 227 When salient
examples of “worst-case scenarios” can readily be brought to mind,
individuals are vulnerable to a phenomenon known as
“probability neglect.” 228
In the bail context, the worst-case scenarios are defendants on
pretrial release who commit horrific and highly-publicized acts of
violence. 229 Because examples of these judicial (or systemic) failures are
readily available, judges may “overestimate the likelihood” that a
defendant on pretrial release will commit a violent crime or they may
“ignore the low likelihood of the event and demand action to prevent

224. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 107–08; Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
779–80 (2001) (reporting experimental evidence showing that judges are susceptible to
heuristics and biases when making judgments).
225. Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do
Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 862 (2015).
226. Id. at 911.
227. Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in MaterialWitness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1363 (2012) (quoting Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 220, at 1127); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 54 (2007);
KAHNEMAN, supra note 221, at 130–31; Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional
Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 162 (2005) (“In sum, an event is more available to
an individual if she has previously personally experienced it, or if it is highly imaginable or is the
subject of widespread and intense media coverage.”).
228. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 Yale L.J.
61, 67 (2002) (“Probability neglect is especially large when people focus on the worst possible
case or otherwise are subject to strong emotions. When such emotions are at work, people do
not give sufficient consideration to the [low] likelihood that the worst case will actually occur.”);
see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 227, at 54, 63.
229. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1359 (“Judges can have a tendency to be biased in
favor of predicting dangerousness, in part because they will be responsible if they erroneously
release a violent individual.”).
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it.” 230 Separating flight risk and dangerousness would ensure both that
evaluations of flight risk are not tainted by fears of dangerousness and
that estimates of dangerousness are not inflated by concerns
about flight. 231
Risk assessment tools address some of these concerns by replacing
reliance on subjective and intuitive judicial measures of risk with more
objective data that is insulated from cognitive bias. 232 But these tools
are generally pitched as a supplement to judicial decision-making, not
as a substitute for it. 233 Most of the tools currently being used do not
separate flight risk and dangerousness. 234
Those risk assessment tools that separate more serious risks of
violence from broader risks of nonviolent reoffending and separate
both of these public safety risks from flight risk235 will, of course, be
more useful for judges identifying appropriate risk-specific conditions
of release. These tools can also be expected to compel, or at least
nudge judges to consider flight risk and dangerousness separately.236
Studies have shown that judges who are required to follow intricate
rules or make more nuanced calculations may be more deliberative. 237
When judges or risk assessment tools instead combine flight risk and

230. Wells, supra note 227, at 162–63 (citing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(2000)) (explaining that the “unknown” risks are also perceived as more serious).
231. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 703
(2015) [hereinafter Rachlinksi, Wistrich & Guthrie, Numeric] (describing the problem of
“anchoring” which occurs when “people construct numeric judgment from the surrounding
context” and it can be a distorting influence when that context is “misleading and irrelevant”).
232. Id. at 699 (explaining that more objective tools like sentencing guidelines may
“limit[] the degree to which erratic judgment might adversely affect outcomes”).
233. But see Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 10 (advocating using risk assessment
tools as the foundation for mandatory bail guidelines that would replace (not complement)
judges’ risk measurement); cf. Rachlinksi, Wistrich & Guthrie, Numeric, supra note 231, at 738
(observing that advisory guidelines “may leave too much room for discretion and hence
for distortion”).
234. See supra Section I.D.3 (describing federal and state tools).
235. See id. (describing the Public Safety Assessment-Court tool that has been developed
by the Arnold Foundation).
236. Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 41 (explaining that
“multifactor tests . . . possess the potential for mitigating cognitive error by nudging judges
toward more deliberative processes”).
237. Id. at 27 (suggesting that the “highly intricate, rule-bound nature” of probable cause
evaluations may “signal[] to judges that intuition might be inconsistent with the governing law”
and thus “facilitate” more deliberative decision-making).
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danger, the risk estimation problems already present in bail hearings
are exacerbated and the calculation of each type of risk could be
distorted or overestimated.
B. Sharpening Distinctions to Provide Restraint and Cover
Over-detention may not simply be a subconscious process. Pretrial
release decisions can pose serious personal and institutional hazards
for judges. Judges who perceive that they bear sole personal
responsibility for a detention decision will deliberately err on the side
of over-detention. 238 When judges release potentially dangerous
individuals who subsequently inflict harm, “the error will be
emblazoned across the front pages,” but when “a judge detains an
individual who would not have committed any wrong had he been
released, that error is invisible—and, indeed, unknowable.”239
Although no judge wants his or her name associated with the crimes
committed by defendants released before trial, this issue will be
exaggerated, of course, for elected judges. 240
Depending on the jurisdiction, the political pressure to detain may
come from multiple constituencies. The public and the news media
are clear sources of this pressure. 241 The bail bonding industry is also

238. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War,
97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 723 (2009); see also Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 5 (“Judges . . .
are wary of bearing public responsibility for crimes that go unpunished—and new crimes that
are committed—because of an erroneous decision to release defendants prior to trial. Erroneous
decisions to detain, on the other hand, produce no similar negative reputational
consequences.”); Goldkamp & Vilcica, supra note 16, at 149 (“[T]he pretrial release decision is
deceptively challenging for judicial decision-makers, with little upside and a large
possible downside.”).
239. Cole, supra note 238, at 696. As one judge, who acknowledged that this was among
his “biggest fears,” explained: “No judge wants to release someone and have that person commit
a violent crime while on release.” Keith L. Alexander, 11 defendants on GPS monitoring charged
with violent crimes in past year in D.C., WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/11-defendants-on-gps-monitoring-charged-withviolent-crimes-in-past-year-in-dc/2013/02/09/9237be1e-6c8b-11e2-ada05ca5fa7ebe79_story.html (quoting D.C. Superior Court judge).
240. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that this may be particularly
problematic for elected judges).
241. See KY. DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE MANUAL 14 (June
2013) (explaining that “judges need as much help as possible” because “they are easy targets for
the media or for politicians”).
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a notorious source of pressure for both elected judges
and legislatures. 242
Pretrial risk aversion is likely connected with judges’ fear of regret.
Regret has been described as being “accompanied by feeling that one
should have known better . . . by thoughts about the mistake one has
made and the opportunities lost . . . , and by wanting to undo the
event and get a second chance.” 243 The risk of regret leads individuals
to favor risk-averse choices. 244 In the case of pretrial detention, the fear
of regret triggers a tendency to fall back on the choice of detention.
If we retain a pretrial system where judges make release
decisions, 245 addressing this problem of judicial will is perhaps the most
important challenge facing modern bail reform efforts. 246 Risk
assessment tools do some of this work by permitting judges to point
to “objective” risk calculations as the justification for a release
decision. These tools will carry more of the weight of pretrial decisionmaking, however, if they map onto existing statutory and
constitutional provisions that call for separate risk analysis. 247 Indeed,
for the reasons noted above, these tools may be able to highlight and
reinforce existing constitutional and statutory requirements that are
too often ignored by judges. A more clearly defined checklist, in which
risks are divided and tools for managing the risks are appropriately
considered, promises to provide greater cover as well. 248

242. Id. at 11–12.
243. KAHNEMAN, supra note 221, at 436.
244. Id. at 349.
245. Some scholars have offered intriguing proposals that would alleviate this problem by
shifting discretion away from judges. Laura Appleman’s proposal would distribute responsibility
for release decisions among a group of community members serving as bail jurors. Appleman,
supra note 5, at 1363–66. Sam Wiseman also advocates taking responsibility for release decisions
away from judges. He would have a bail commission set mandatory guidelines based on risk
assessment data. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 37–47.
246. The problem of political will has perennially thwarted reform efforts. See Simonson,
supra note 9, at 35–36 (describing the need for “political will to release more defendants
pretrial” and asserting the community bail funds “are in a unique position to chip away at the
political obstacles to real change”); cf. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1347–48
(explaining that increasing the use of electronic monitoring technology or “finding other ways
of ensuring a non-dangerous defendant’s presence at trial” are not questions “of ability, but
of will”).
247. See supra Part II.
248. See infra notes 262–263 and accompanying text.
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C. Isolating Risks to Improve Accountability and Legitimacy
Other than cases where defendants on release commit violent
offenses, judges receive little information about the outcomes of their
bail decisions. 249 Given that the rare feedback they do receive is skewed
toward the worst outcomes, judges are more “conservative” and
“defensive” in making release decisions. 250 Improving the collection
and communication of data about pretrial outcomes is therefore a
priority for reform. 251
Judges are also criticized for being inaccurate gauges of
community preferences about bail and pretrial release. Judges
generally lack information about or accountability for the financial
costs of their release and detention decisions. 252 Laura Appleman, Sam
Wiseman, and Jocelyn Simonson have each outlined bail solutions that
help make judges more aware of and beholden to, community
interests in pretrial decision-making. In theory, the bail commission
that would draft Wiseman’s bail guidelines, 253 Appleman’s community

249. Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 127 (explaining that judges are not given data
on “the many defendants who negotiate the adjudication process without problems during
pretrial release,” but they do receive “negative” feedback because “the media will soundly
criticize release decisions when one has gone wrong”).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 150 (recommending improvements to both judicial training and “systemic
feedback”; otherwise, judges may default to bail and detention “rather than to experiment with
what they perceive to be risky or undeveloped community release options”).
252. As Wiseman explains, a typical pretrial hearing is a venue with a classic and serious
principal-agent problem because judges “bear blame” for defendants who fail on pretrial release.
“And judges, unlike legislative bodies, are not responsible for increased jail budgets, lost tax
revenues, and drains on social services resulting, directly or indirectly, from their decisions.”
Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 10.
253. Wiseman’s proposal for more influential bail commissions and guidelines could be a
tool for improving data collection and better communicating that data and other community
feedback to judges. He clearly envisions that the commission would have more awareness of,
and concern for, the public fisc than judges have. See id. at 61.
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bail jury, 254 and the community bail funds that Simonson analyzes255
would each more accurately weigh the purported public safety benefits
of detention against its financial expense and other costs to the
community. Community members may also be more protective, on
principle, of defendants’ liberty interests. 256
Building properly defined risk assessment tools with risk measures
based on regularly updated or validated data about pretrial release
outcomes 257 remedies many of these feedback and accountability
problems. This data should be more available to judges interpreting
risk measures as well. Strangely, many risk assessment tools that have
been proposed gather separate data for those defendants who commit
crimes on release 258 and for those who fail to appear, but then combine
that data into a single prediction of “pretrial failure.” 259 It is difficult
for that feedback to be properly incorporated by judges, by those who
will use outcome data to validate and update the quality of the risk
assessment tools, and by others in the community who are analyzing
the criminal justice system and bail reform efforts. 260 Isolating flight
risk from dangerousness helps to identify the importance of each type
of risk on its own.
Separate consideration of the risks should also facilitate more
transparent and precise discussions of community priorities and fiscal
254. Appleman focuses more on the community’s superiority as a gauge of community
safety threats and on the potential benefit of fostering greater community investment in, and
understanding of, the criminal justice system. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1355–58. She does,
however, also describe the “local public[’s] . . . meaningful interest in uncovering the procedures
involved in denying or granting bail, especially because so many taxpayer dollars are being used
to incarcerate those who have not yet been determined guilty.” Id. at 1364.
255. Simonson, supra note 9, at 6 (“[W]hen a “community” group posts bail, it calls into
question the widespread assumption that the community and the defendant sit on opposite ends
of a scale of justice.”).
256. See id. at 47; see also Appleman, supra note 5, at 1365.
257. See supra Section I.D.3 explaining procedures for developing and refining risk
assessment tools.
258. As noted above, most tools combine violent and nonviolent reoffending. See id.
(distinguishing the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment-Court tool which separates
risks of violent and nonviolent reoffending).
259. See id. (explaining that the Public Safety Assessment-Court is an exception and divides
flight risk and dangerousness).
260. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 43 (clarifying that feedback to judges
is not the sole purpose of guidelines-type reforms: “[I]n large part, evolutionary change is
expected to follow from the increased visibility of the decision itself, from public and professional
comment and critique of the basis of bail decisions”).
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constraints. 261 A system that is known to have so much pretextual
decision-making is not one that will be viewed as legitimate by the
community. Clarity about the purposes of the law and the intentions
of system actors has immediate potential value in enhancing the
perceived legitimacy of the system. Of course, transparency may also
force much-needed conversations about the problematic and
troubling mismatch between our intentions or purposes in the bail
context, and the oppressive processes of the pretrial system.
D. Managing Flight and Danger Differently
A particular defendant’s level of flight risk or dangerousness is not
a fixed number that exists in a vacuum—it must be assessed in
reference to available conditions of release. In other words, the true
task facing judges making release and detention decisions is not merely
a risk measurement task; it is a risk management task. 262 The final
policy-based reason that flight risk should be analyzed separately from
dangerousness is because of differences in conditions of release: many
of the conditions that judges can impose to manage or mitigate risk
are suited to flight risk or dangerousness, but not to both. 263 By
weighing the risks separately and considering them in light of the
available risk management options, we can begin to engage more
challenging questions. How effective are these conditions of release at
managing flight risk or dangerousness? What degree of risk warrants
the imposition of one of these conditions of release? 264 Research on
these understudied questions will be essential.

261. Id. (describing the promise of bail guidelines to “provide important feedback relevant
to core policy concerns”).
262. Cf. Starr, supra note 152 at 806–07 (critiquing risk assessment tools for failing to
predict how the court intervention—the sentencing decision—“will affect the defendant’s
recidivism risk”). And it is a task that ought to be revisited during pretrial detention (although
too often, it is not).
263. This argument is included here as a policy-based reason (and not previously as a
statutory requirement) because federal and state statutes do not expressly limit the use of most
conditions of release to manage either flight or danger. Under Salerno, however, a mismatch
between the risks presented by a defendant (i.e., the government’s regulatory needs) and the
conditions of release imposed would qualify as “excessive bail.” See supra notes 56–62 and
accompanying text. With separated risks, these constitutional claims may be more successful than
they have been to date.
264. Cf. Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 57, at 41–43 (arguing that
increasing use of risk assessment tools requires clearer articulation of the risks that justify pretrial

893

2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/2/16 5:29 PM

2016

The federal and state statutes analyzed in Part II provide some
guidance to judges about how to organize and sequence the risk
measurement and management tasks they must undertake when
making pretrial release and detention decisions. Many of those statutes
begin with presumptions favoring release, then move to available
conditions of release, and close by providing limited circumstances in
which detention may be ordered. Although, as noted above, those
statutes include some explicit restrictions (e.g., dictating when and
how flight risk and dangerousness may drive a detention order 265 and
linking financial conditions to flight risk 266), the statutes are not clear
enough. Existing judicial checklists similarly neglect this important
issue: although federal judges work from a benchbook that includes
guidelines for making bail decisions, those guidelines include no
direction about separating consideration of flight risk
and dangerousness. 267
1. Conditions that manage flight risk
If a defendant poses a significant enough flight risk that release on
recognizance is inappropriate, a judge must evaluate what flightrelated conditions of release are necessary to manage that risk.268
Although statutes generally do not designate conditions of release
according to the risks that they mitigate, there are numerous
conditions of release that are geared toward managing flight risk. 269
These include, most frequently, financial conditions like bail or
secured bonds that are believed to incentivize defendants to return to

detention or other pretrial restraints); see also id. at 42 (Those risks “should be expressed in terms
of both the severity and the likelihood of the feared harm in a specified timespan.”).
265. See supra Section II.B.
266. See supra Section II.C.
267. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 1.3 (6th
ed. 2013). A proposal to revise federal and state bail checklists is the focus of a separate work
in progress.
268. As noted supra, if no conditions of release can adequately mitigate this risk, then a
judge may order detention based on flight risk. Given cheap and effective electronic tracking
options and other technological advances, however, flight-based detention should be rare. See
Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
269. It bears repeating that for purposes of this Article, both the risk that a defendant will
flee the jurisdiction and the risk that a defendant will fail to appear are encompassed by the term
“flight risk.” Defining flight risk and nonappearance is the project of another work in progress.
See Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 25.
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court instead of fleeing. They also include unsecured bonds, where
defendants pay nothing up front but are penalized if they fail to return
to court. As noted in previous sections, these financial conditions are
entirely flight focused.
Judges are also empowered to prevent a defendant from fleeing
the jurisdiction by making use of a range of supervision conditions.
These conditions range from supervision by a designated custodian,270
to regular reporting requirements to pretrial services (or some other
agency), 271 to residency programs at halfway houses. 272 Some wellfunded defendants have been able to negotiate release by paying for
private security to monitor their home detention, but this costly selffunded release option is not available to the vast majority of
defendants. 273 Sam Wiseman has written extensively about electronic
monitoring technology and its potential to resuscitate the Excessive
Bail Clause. As he explains, “[i]ncreasingly sophisticated remote
monitoring devices have the potential to sharply reduce the need for
flight-based pretrial detention.” 274 This type of monitoring would likely
be more cost-effective than ordering detention based on flight.275
Courts concerned about flight can also impose various sorts of
travel restrictions on defendants. 276 These restrictions include passport
revocations and reliance on no-fly lists to prevent international travel.
Travel can also be more tightly controlled in conjunction with
electronic monitoring.

270. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(i) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16217(b)(2)(a).
271. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(vi).
272. VanNostrand et al., supra note 133, at 16.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp.2d 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(approving release to home confinement monitored by private security paid for by defendant’s
wife); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (release appropriate where
defendants agreed to pay all costs associated with 24-hour private security). Courts have rejected
the claim that defendants are entitled to fund this sort of supervision, however. See, e.g., United
States v. Banki, 369 F. App’x 152, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that it was not legal error to
deny defendant the option of paying for home confinement because the government would
incur additional costs associated with supervising privately-financed home confinement).
274. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1347–48.
275. Id. at 1372–74 (explaining that more research on cost-effectiveness is needed but
“the available data suggest that [electronic monitoring] can be at least as cheap and effective as
money bail”).
276. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(iv); United States v. Xulam, 83 F.3d 441, 443
(1st Cir. 1996) (noting that government’s seizure of travel documents mitigated flight risk).
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2. Conditions that mitigate danger
If concerns about dangerousness are the reason that release on
recognizance is not appropriate, a judge can impose conditions of
release that mitigate or manage dangerousness. There are a number of
statutory conditions that are clearly intended to manage or mitigate
dangerousness or related witness safety concerns. A few obvious
examples include avoiding contact with alleged victims and
witnesses, 277 complying with a curfew, 278 and refraining from
possessing weapons. 279 Employment and education obligations280 may
mitigate flight risk by anchoring a defendant to the jurisdiction but
those seem to be more promising as means of keeping released
defendants out of trouble, thus managing danger.
Electronic monitoring technology can also be used to manage at
least some public safety risks, including monitoring any defendant’s
home detention, tracking alleged sex offenders’ whereabouts, and
ensuring that defendants in domestic violence cases abide by stay-away
orders. 281 This sort of monitoring, however, operates differently with
respect to flight risk and danger. Wearing a GPS monitor hopefully
dissuades alleged offenders from committing crimes (a deterrence
argument), but it actually prevents a suspect from successfully
disappearing, so long as the technology functions properly.
Judges are also empowered to require released defendants to
“refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or
other controlled substance” 282 or to obtain drug or alcohol

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(v).
See, e.g., id. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(vii); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:162-17 (b)(2)(f).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(viii); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2)(g).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2)(b)–(c).
See, e.g., EDNA EREZ ET AL., GPS MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE:
AN
EVALUATION
STUDY
i
(June
2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238910.pdf (“GPS tracking seems to increase
[domestic violence] defendants’ compliance with program rules compared to those who are
monitored but not tracked.”); Peter M. Thomson, A Comprehensive Strategy Targeting
Recidivist Criminals with Continuous Real-Time GPS Monitoring: Is Reverse Engineering Crime
Control Possible?, 12 ENGAGE 23, 24 (Nov. 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/
publications/detail/a-comprehensive-strategy-targeting-recidivist-criminals-with-continuousreal-time-gps-monitoring-is-reverse-engineering-crime-control-possible
(asserting
that
improvements in the precision and accuracy of GPS technology make possible broader uses to
manage public safety risks).
282. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(ix).
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treatment. 283 These conditions are arguably driven by both flight risk
and danger but they clearly operate in different ways on those different
risks. Judges may view defendants’ substance abuse problems as
increasing the risk that they will not appear for trial (i.e., sober
defendants will be less likely to miss court dates) but they don’t likely
influence a defendant’s inclination to flee the jurisdiction. 284 Courts
also typically view drug or alcohol abuse as more directly increasing a
more troublesome risk: that a defendant will engage in
violent offenses. 285
Given that judges have different ways of managing flight risk and
dangerousness, they need to develop separate predictions for the two
risks. Tools developed to assist judges with this task should separate
flight risk and danger. Risk assessment tools that generate a cumulative
risk of pretrial failure have limited utility. Instead, the merger of risks
may reinforce or worsen other significant problems with pretrial
decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Bail reform efforts, it turns out, are a sort of cyclical phenomenon
in this country and this is our third time around. Questions of how to
constrain judicial discretion or improve judicial risk assessment have
puzzled each generation. Efforts around the country to reform or
abandon money bail systems and to reduce the number of defendants
detained before trial depend on clarification of the approach that
judges must take to the measurement and management of
pretrial risks.
When they published their study of bail guidelines in 1985, John
S. Goldkamp and Michael R. Gottfredson described the problem this
way: “Too much discretion without explicit goals or criteria produces
decisions that are chaotic and, by definition, inequitable.” 286 While

283. See, e.g., id. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(x).
284. Here again, the distinction between a defendant who fails to appear because he is
intoxicated on his court date poses a different sort of threat than one who flees the jurisdiction.
Drug abuse seems much more likely to influence the former than the latter. For a more detailed
discussion of the difference between the costs imposed by nonappearance and those imposed by
true flight, see Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 25.
285. Baradaran, Drugs, supra note 168, at 233, 254–58, 276–81 (collecting cases that
describe this perceived “nexus” linking drugs and violence but concluding that there is
insufficient empirical support for a causal link).
286. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 29.
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modern risk assessment tools certainly help to address some of these
concerns by taking risk calculation work away from judges, many of
these tools are flawed in ways that reinforce problematic judicial
practices instead of correcting them. There are constitutional,
statutory, and policy-based reasons that judges making pretrial release
and detention decisions must disentangle flight risk from
dangerousness. Although these constraints are not always evident in
practice, reform efforts and tools must reflect them.
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